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Autonomous robots are used more and more in remote and inaccessible places 
where they cannot be easily repaired if damaged or improperly programmed. A system is 
needed that allows these robots to repair themselves by recovering gracefully from damage 
and adapting to unforeseen changes. Newborn infants employ such a system to adapt to 
a new and dynamic world by building a hierarchical representation of their environment. 
This model allows them to respond robustly to changes by falling back to an earlier stage 
of knowledge, rather than failing completely. A computational model that replicates these 
phenomena in infants would afford a mobile robot the same adaptability and robustness 
that infants have. This dissertation presents such a model, the Constructivist Learning Ar-
chitecture (CLA), that builds a hierarchical knowledge base using a set of interconnected 
self-organizing learning modules. The dissertation then demonstrates that CLA (1) repli-
cates current studies in infant cognitive development, (2) builds sensorimotor schemas for 
robot control, (3) learns a goal-directed task from delayed rewards, and (4) can fall back 
and recover gracefully from damage. CLA is a new approach to robot control that allows 
robots to recover from damage or adapt to unforeseen changes in the environment. CLA 
is also a new approach to cognitive modeling that can be used to better understand how 
people learn for their environment in infancy and adulthood.
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1. Introduction
Robots are being employed 
for tasks that allow minimal human 
interaction and accessibility (Figure 
1.1). As these robots become more 
autonomous, it is more important for 
them to be more flexible in the face 
of unplanned conditions, adaptive 
to unforeseen changes, and robust 
during unexpected problems. For a 
robot to meet these requirements, it 
must have a controller that can adapt 
to its environment and retrain itself 
when the environment changes.
This dissertation solves this 
problem by looking to infant cognitive development. Young infants learn a great deal from 
their environment that they use throughout their lives. They are constantly adapting to new 
features in the world starting with the simplest perceptions of the world, and respond to 
new and unexpected information through adaptation.
This introduction motivates the work presented later by describing the problem of 
robust autonomy, and how it this problem is similar to the issues faced by young infants. 
The approach to this problem is then proposed: by building a learning system that models 
infant cognitive development, this system can be used by an autonomous robot for robust 
control.
Figure 1.1: Mars rover Spirit. The autonomous robot sent 
to explore Mars. Robots are being used more for autono-
mous operation far from their human operators, so they need 
to be resilient to unforeseen problems. A learning system to 
address this need is the subject of this dissertation.
2
1.1 Motivation
As robots become more sophisticated, articulated and affordable, they are being 
used with increasing frequency for tasks that would be too costly or hazardous for a hu-
mans to perform. Robots today can carry an impressive array of tools and perform tricky 
physical tasks. Remote controlled robots are used to disarm bombs, keeping human techni-
cians at a safe distance. Submersible robots are sent to explore the ocean floor, which is 
inhospitable to human explorers. Robots are sent into buildings damaged by earthquakes to 
locate people who are trapped, and free them. Rather than incur the expense and potential 
loss of life that human space travel might bring about, robots are sent to Mars to explore 
and report findings back to scientists on Earth. Robots are getting better, cheaper, and are 
expendable, making them a good alternative to human explorers and technicians.
Often, these applications require that robots not only perform sophisticated tasks, 
but do so with limited human intervention, and with limited foreknowledge of the robotʼs 
eventual operating environment. For example, when NASA designed Spirit and Opportuni-
ty (the robots sent to explore Mars; Figure 1.1) they had to take into account the 10 minute 
signal transmission time from Earth to Mars, and another 10 minutes to send a signal back. 
This time delay makes direct control of the rovers untenable: a robot that is rolling along 
towards a drop-off would not receive a command to stop or turn until 20 minutes later, at 
which time it could be in pieces at the bottom of a cliff. Consequently, these robots oper-
ate autonomously by sensing their environment, seeking goals, and avoiding dangers with 
minimal human intervention.
1.1.1 Importance of Flexibility
Perhaps the biggest issue with autonomous robotics is flexibility. In addition to 
performing its task and avoiding dangers, an autonomous robot must handle situations that 
its engineers did not foresee. For example, the Martian terrain could be softer than had 
previously been known, which would change the way the robot moves around. The robot 
could wander into the shade of an outcropping of rock, making objects look different to 
the cameras than they do in direct sunlight. Or the robot could sustain some damage during 
its operation, knocking the camera to the left of center and shifting the robotʼs view of the 
world. All of these issues would impact the performance of the robot, and the robotʼs engi-
neers must predict every possible problem and design its controller to operate under these 
new circumstances. How flexible the robotʼs controller is determines how well the robot 
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would continue operating. If the change is unexpected and significant, the robot could 
easily be rendered inoperative or unusable for the mission. Since the reason the robot was 
sent to Mars in the first place was because it was too difficult to send people, there is little 
chance that a technician could be sent out for some field repair.
Consequently, much of the engineering of autonomous robots involves preparing 
for the unexpected. Engineers must conceive every possible problem the robot might en-
counter, and develop a controller that can account for all of them. This approach has two 
drawbacks. First, a controller that has specialized code for every possible problem will, 
under normal circumstances, be largely unused. Even if something goes wrong, only the 
part of the controller that handles the specific problem will be utilized, while the rest goes 
unexecuted. Not only is this an issue of computational resources, but of the amount of time 
spent by engineers trying to see into the future when they could be making the robot better 
in other ways. Of course, some amount of exception handling is always included in even 
the simplest software, but there is clearly a trade-off between robustness and resources. 
Second, it is not possible to plan for unforeseen problems. Robots are complex systems and 
many robot environments, like Mars, are complex as well. It is unlikely that a team of en-
gineers will account for every possible problem the robot might encounter. No matter how 
much planning goes into building the robot controller, there will always be circumstances 
that the robot engineers did not plan for. And the problem for which there is no plan then 
renders the robot inoperative.
One solution to this problem is to let the robot figure out its own solution to any 
problem it might encounter. The robot already has the autonomy to pursue its goals and 
avoid dangers, so it is a natural extension to allow the robot to adapt to its environment. 
A robot that adapted to changes in the environment would not only discover solutions to 
problems, but would discover better, unforeseen ways of achieving its goals. Instead of 
building a controller to handle every possible problem, engineers can focus on the single 
problem of how the robot can adapt and let the robot re-program itself by learning its own 
model of the world, and by building its own controller to achieve goals and avoid danger.
How does one create a learning system that develops its own model of the world, 
but is also sophisticated enough to handle complex tasks efficiently? Fortunately, this is 
a problem that has already been solved; indeed, it has already been solved by each of us. 
Every human infant faces this same issue at birth: they are introduced to a world that is 
entirely new to them, and must build up a world model that allows them to perform com-
plex tasks. Infants are constantly introduced to new information in the world, and all the 
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while their bodies are changing and growing. Infants are famously adept at solving prob-
lems and overcoming obstacles. The learning system used by infants addresses all of the 
requirements of an adaptable, autonomous learning system. Therefore, a learning system 
that models infant cognitive development will also give a robot robust autonomy. This 
conjecture is the central hypothesis of the dissertation.
1.1.2 Fallback and Recovery
One particularly useful technique used by infants to achieve adaptive, robust be-
havior is fallback. An infant has a partially learned a skill set, but is confronted with a 
situation which its nascent skills cannot handle. Rather than fail completely, the infant will 
utilize an earlier skill set (Cohen and Oakes 1993). Eventually, infants will integrate the 
novel situation into its skill set and recover its ability to cope with it. Fallback is an impor-
tant feature for a robot controller because the robotʼs performance can gracefully degrade 
under suboptimal conditions, rather than completely fail.
To illustrate the concept of fallback, consider the following example. (This is not 
a scientific study, simply an illustration of the fallback principle at work.) Amateur typists 
start out using the “hunt and peck” method: they search for a the first letter, press the key, 
then search for the next letter, press the key, etc. As typists become more experienced, they 
become more familiar with the finger movements needed frequent letter combinations and 
eventually whole words and phrases. Typing a pervasive word like “the” becomes one 
swift action when the fingers move almost in parallel on the keyboard.
When presented with a keyboard with different dimensions, such as a thumbboard, 
the experienced typist is presented with a challenge: all of the learned procedures to move 
fingers certain distances, and the sensory feedback from the fingers that guide the typing 
process, are useless because the thumbboard cannot accommodate all ten fingers like a 
full-sized keyboard can. But part of what makes thumbboards successful is that they are 
actually easy to use for experienced typists: all of the skill is not lost. The skill of typing 
does not depend entirely on the direct motor commands to the fingers and the exact feed-
back from the hand, but has many layers from the concrete — such as muscle contractions 
in the finger — to the abstract, like the combination of finger movements needed to type 
“the.” Therefore the typist can fall back to a lower, less abstract level of skill to achieve 
the goal. Of course, there is an initial degradation in performance, but eventually the typist 
will recover the full typing skill as lower-level knowledge develops new high-level skills 
specific to the thumbboard.
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Now consider a more radical change to the keyboard configuration. Imagine that 
the typist must now move from a standard “QWERTY” keyboard to a modern “Dvorak” 
key configuration. Now the typist is faced with a more fundamental challenge, and cannot 
even rely on knowledge of relative key positions. The typist must fall back to an even lower 
level of skill, perhaps all the way back to the “hunt and peck” approach. Even so, the typist 
will still recover as new knowledge is built on these lower-level skills and, eventually, the 
typist will become expert on this new keyboard configuration.
Fallback is a strategy for dealing with a change in the environment, small or large, 
by allowing agents to respond by falling back to a lower level of skill, rather than com-
pletely failing. Fallback is usually accompanied by a degradation in performance, but only 
partial or “graceful” degradation. Eventually, the agent will recover from the skill degra-
dation and once again become an expert at the task. This is a technique that infants use to 
cope with a new and ever changing environment. It is also the technique that is used to give 
robots robust control.
1.2 Approach
To build a computational model of infant cognitive development, the model must 
be based on evidence of the learning mechanism used by infants. Piaget (1936; 1937) pro-
posed a theory for infant cognitive development called constructivism, which describes 
the part-to-whole system used by infants to integrate simple ideas into increasingly more 
complex ones. Constructivism is a powerful theory of infant cognition, but the details of 
the learning mechanisms in constructivism have long remained a mystery. Since Piaget, 
new techniques have been developed that have brought about a watershed of new empirical 
evidence of infant cognition and cognitive development. This evidence has been integrated 
to form a set of Information Processing Principles (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002) which 
outline, at a high level, the nature of the learning mechanism used by infants.
This new empirical evidence allows for a model of infant cognitive development to 
be built. This model, the Constructivist Learning Architecture (CLA) is first presented in 
this dissertation. CLA is an unsupervised learning system that builds a hierarchical knowl-
edge base from observing the environment. CLA is built by interconnecting a hierarchy of 
Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs; Kohonen 1997). SOMs are chosen because they are unsu-
pervised, self-organizing learning systems that have previously modeled both cognition 
and neuroscience.
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CLA is shown to be a model of infant cognitive development by reproducing stud-
ies in the challenging domain of causal acquisition. While the prevailing view had been 
that infants can innately perceive causal events (Leslie 1984), recent studies suggest that 
causal perception is learned (Cohen & Amsel 1998). The purpose of this experiment is not 
just to show that CLA can learn what infants learn. More important is that CLA learn in 
the same way as infants — by building high-level concepts from lower-level knowledge 
— and fail in same way as infants — by falling back to a prior skill set.
To operate as a robot controller, CLA must move beyond self-organization of per-
ceptual stimuli and build sensorimotor schemas that associate perceptions with actions. 
Such a system was proposed by Drescher (1991), and his Schema Mechanism had stood as 
the only constructivist sensorimotor schema building system. This dissertation presents a 
technique for using CLA to build a hierarchy of sensorimotor schemas that is more efficient 
the Schema Mechanism and, more importantly, is the first such implementation that also 
models infant cognition.
Finally, to achieve goal-directed behavior, a technique is introduced whereby CLA 
can learn from delayed rewards. This technique allows a robot to use CLA as a controller 
by building a hierarchy of sensorimotor schemas, and linking the schemas together to build 
a plan for achieving a goal. CLA represents a complementary approach to Reinforcement 
Learning (Sutton & Barto 1998) that elaborates the agentʼs state-space by constructing new 
features. Ultimately, CLA makes a robot robust by utilizing CLA̓ s fallback ability. Build-
ing a model of infant cognitive development and using it as a robot controller will give a 
robot the grounded knowledge, adaptation and robustness of an infant.
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of four parts: Introduction and Background  (Chapters 1 
and 2), CLA (Chapter 4), Applications (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), and Evaluation (Chapters 8 
and 9). Because this work spans both computer science and psychology, related work is 
discussed in each chapter, where appropriate.
Chapter 2 reviews research in psychology and computer science upon which the 
work in this dissertation is based, including Piagetʼs (1936; 1937) theory of constructiv-
ism and the Information Processing Principles (Cohen, Chaput and Cashon 2002). Also 
discussed is the Self Organizing Map (SOM; Kohonen 1997), a central technology used in 
the Constructivist Learning Architecture.
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Chapter 3 describes the Constructivist Learning Architecture, a model of infant 
cognitive development used by robots for robust autonomy. This is the main contribution 
of this dissertation.
In Chapter 4, CLA is demonstrated as a model of infant cognition by modeling an 
infantʼs acquisition of causal perception. CLA is shown to be robust when presented with 
noisy data. CLA is also compared to other models of infant cognition.
In Chapter 5, CLA is shown to be a robot controller. CLA reimplements the Sche-
ma Mechanism (Drescher 1991), a constructivist controller for autonomous robots. CLA 
replicates all the functionality of the Schema Mechanism, but more efficiently. Moreover, 
CLA is shown not only to be a cognitive model, but also a learning system that can control 
a mobile robot.
Chapter 6 combines the ideas of the two previous chapters and applies CLA to a 
realistic robot and environment. CLA is used by a robot to learn how to forage for speci-
mens. CLA learns hidden features in the environment, and recovers gracefully when arti-
ficially damaged. CLA is also compared to other robot controllers and systems that learn 
using delayed rewards.
Chapter 7 discusses the accomplishments of this dissertation and suggests some 
potential future work that can come from it. Finally, Chapter 8 presents an overview of the 
work presented in this dissertation and concludes.
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2. Foundations
This dissertation describes a computational model of infant cognitive development 
which is also used by mobile robots for robust autonomous control. Two areas of research 
— infant cognition and machine learning — form the basis of the model. This chapter pro-
vides an overview of the foundations in these two areas.
The central thesis of the dissertation is that a model of infant cognitive development 
can be used to establish robust control for autonomous robots . To provide a background 
for modeling infant cognitive development, this chapter first discusses the subject of infant 
cognition, starting with Piagetʼs (1952) theory of Constructivism, and moving through a 
body of contemporary studies in infant cognition and cognitive development. The section 
concludes with a look at a new approach to infant cognitive development, the Information 
Processing Principles, which forms the basis of the model presented in this dissertation.
The model presented here is based on previous work in machine learning. Specifi-
cally, the model uses the Self-Organizing Map (SOM; Kohonen 1997) as a central compu-
tational unit. The second section will describe the SOM, detail how the SOM learns, and 
discuss its relevance to the area of infant cognitive development.
In the following chapter, these two scientific areas are merged to form the compu-
tational model that is the main contribution of this dissertation: the Constructivist Learning 
Architecture, or CLA.
2.1 Psychological Foundations
The theoretical foundation of this dissertation comes from the field of infant psy-
chology. This section provides an overview of some important research in this field, start-
ing with Piagetʼs (1936; 1937) theory of Constructivism, moving to more modern studies 
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in infant cognition, and finally to an Information Processing approach to infant cognitive 
development. This section includes a description of the Information Processing Principles 
(Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002) which are the central ideas upon which this research is 
based.
2.1.1 Constructivism
The modern study of infant cognition can truly be said to have started with the re-
search of Piaget (1936; 1937). His seminal work in the area of infant cognition presented 
for the first time a comprehensive picture of infant cognitive development, and provided a 
theory of infant cognition called Constructivism.
Constructivism describes, among other things, a stage-like developmental pattern 
that Piaget observed in infants. Piaget theorized that infants had knowledge in the form of 
schemas through which the infant could process and comprehend its environment. Schemas 
could be propositional schemas that relate and classify observations, sensorimotor schemas 
that relate observations to actions, or operational schemas that describe systems and their 
inner workings. Operational schemas come later in an infancyʼs development, but propo-
sitional and sensorimotor schemas are constructed immediately and play a central role in 
cognitive development. (There will be examples of both propositional and sensorimotor 
schemas in later chapters.)
The developmental aspect of schemas has two parts: assimilation and accommo-
dation. In assimilation, the infant attempts to apply what it knows (that is, its schemas) to 
everything in its world. All observations are viewed and processed in terms of the infantʼs 
schemas. This process is characterized as schemas assimilating the world.
However, the world cannot always be addressed by the infantʼs complement of 
schemas. There are limits to the applicability of any given schema, and some things in the 
infantʼs environment may not apply to any of the infantʼs schemas. Piaget characterized 
this as “resistance to the external world.” In response, the infant must accommodate the 
world, which is accomplished by creating a new set of schemas that describe those aspects 
of the world that are not addressed by the existing set of schemas.
Since schemas assimilate every object, they also assimilate other schemas in ad-
dition to direct environmental observation. Thus, when new schemas are built to accom-
modate the world, they take into account not only the infantʼs experience with the environ-
ment, but preexisting schemas as well. In other words, new schemas are constructed using 
old schemas. It is this part-to-whole progression — the essence of constructivism — that 
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allows infants to start with a very simple view of the world and build a complex, hierarchi-
cal knowledge base for mature behavior.
2.1.2 Contemporary Studies in Infant Cognition
While Piaget (1936; 1937) provided a comprehensive theory of infant cognitive 
development, the field lacked the necessary techniques for probing the details of cogni-
tive development in infants, and he was unable to provide a formal model of constructiv-
ism. Consequently, the field of infant cognition eventually responded with a more nativist 
view.
Not until the advent of the habituation technique were researchers able to explore 
the details of infant cognition. The habituation technique relies on a novelty preference 
in infants. When an infant is presented with the same familiar scene again and again, the 
infant will grow bored and look away from the scene, presumably in search of something 
new. If, however, the infant is presented with something new, the infant will look longer. 
Thus, looking time can be used as a measure of novelty.
An experimenter, then, can design a habituation experiment using a scene that can 
be familiar in one way, and novel in another way. Such an experiment can be used to deter-
mine how the infant is processing the scene.
For example, Cohen and Younger (1984) used the habituation technique to deter-
mine how infants processed the visual perception of angles. The stimuli they used is repro-
duced in Figure 2.1. In the study, infants were repeatedly presented with a 45° angle Train-
Training Stimulus Test A Test B
Figure 2.1: Stimuli for an infant habituation experiment. These stimuli were used by Cohen and Young-
er (1984) to determine how infants cognitively process angles. The Training Stimulus is a 45° angle, which 
the infants would be see until they habituated. Then infants were presented with one of two test stimuli. 
Test A is also a 45° angle, but the line segments that make up the angle are at a different orientation from 
the Training Stimulus. Test B retains the orientation of the line segments in the Training Stimulus, but they 
are configured to make a 135° angle. Infants that process angles as a whole will see Test A as similar to the 
Training Stimulus, and thus dishabituate more to the novel angle in Test B. Infants that process the stimuli 
as two individual line segments will recognize the segments in Test B and respond more to the new orienta-
tion of Test A. The habituation experiment is a useful tool for probing the nature of an infantʼs perception 
and cognition.
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ing Stimulus until the infant had habituated and started looking less and less. The infant 
was then presented with one of two different test stimuli. One test stimulus was another 45° 
angle, but one that had been rotated so that the line segments that made up the angle were at 
a different orientation than the Training Stimulus. The other test preserved the orientation 
of the line segments, but connected them to create a 135° angle. If the infant processed the 
stimuli using primarily the angle information, then the infant will recognize the 45° angle 
as similar to the Training Stimulus, and not respond very much, while at the same time the 
135° angle will appear novel — despite having the same line segment orientations — and 
will cause the infant to dishabituate. On the other hand, if the infant processed the objects 
as individual line segments, then the rotated 45° angle would appear to be completely new, 
while the 135° angle would be familiar.
New Developmental Evidence
With the introduction of the habituation technique, most contemporary studies of 
infant cognition focussed on providing experimental proof of the current nativist theo-
ries. Many studies postulated the that much of infant knowledge was innate or precocious, 
such as the ability to process object unity (Kellman and Spelke 1983), object persistence 
(Baillargeon 1987; Baillargeon, Spelke & Wasserman 1985), object individuation (Wilcox 
and Baillergeon 1998), and object solidity (Spelke et al 1992).
Many of these studies, though, relied on testing infants only at a single age, and 
often over-interpreted the results. In response, other researchers performed follow-up stud-
ies on infants at multiple ages and found evidence that infants exhibited a developmental 
progression in these and many other areas (see Cohen & Cashon 2003 for an overview). 
For example, Cohen and Younger (1984), using the stimuli mentioned above, determined 
whether infants at different ages perceived angular relations. They found that infants at 
14 weeks would process the stimuli as whole angles, ignoring the orientation of the line 
segments. However, 6-week-olds would respond to the line segment orientation, and be 
unresponsive to the angle information. While these findings are not definitive proof that 
infants learn this knowledge, it does make the nativist explanation less parsimonious. This 
same technique was applied to find developmental trends in many domains, including ob-
ject unity (Slator, Morison et al 1990; Johnson & Nañez 1995), object persistence (Bogartz, 
Shinskey & Schilling, 2000; Cashon & Cohen, 2000; Schilling, 2000), object individua-
tion (Needham 2001), object solidity (Cohen, Gilbert and Brown 1996), facial perception 
(Cohen & Cashon 2001), and causality (Cohen, Amsel, Redford, and Casasola 1998).
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2.1.3 An Information Processing Approach to Cognitive Development
With the discovery of developmental trends in so many different areas, a pattern 
started to emerge among all the studies. Regardless of the domain, the method of devel-
opment appeared to be similar in each case, and it resembled the constructivist theory of 
Piaget. However, unlike before, these studies uncovered more details of the developmental 
process, and a sharper picture of infant cognitive development could be drawn. From these 
studies came an Information Processing approach to infant cognitive development (Cohen 
1998), which postulated that much of infant knowledge thought to be innate can actually 
be accounted for by processing information in the environment. Additionally, much of the 
observed developmental phenomena  — such as stage-like development, or the so-called 
U-shaped curve — can be explained by the self-organization methods used to process 
information, rather than through external forces, such as physiological development or 
normative feedback.
The Information Processing approach to infant cognitive development is essen-
tially a restatement of Piagetʼs constructivism framed in the context of modern learning 
systems. This approach can be summed up using six Information Processing Principles 
(Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002), which are listed below. These principles were arrived 
by examining developmental changes in several different topics considered to be aspects 
either of infant perception or infant cognition. These are:
1. Infants are endowed with an innate information-processing system.
Infants are born neither with a blank slate nor a preponderance of innate core knowledge. 
Rather, infants are born with a system that enables them to learn about their environment 
and develop a repertoire of knowledge. From the outset, the innate system provides archi-
tectural constraints in how this learning may be accomplished. The system is designed to 
allow the young infant access to low-level information, such as orientation, sound, color, 
texture, and movement.
2. Infants form higher schemas from lower schemas.
In other words, the learning system is hierarchical. As the infant learns and develops, infor-
mation that is accessed becomes more and more complex, building upon prior processed 
information. An assumption underlying this principle is that the ability to process more 
complex information is the result of being able to integrate the lower-level schemas  into a 
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more complex, higher-level schema. That integration is based upon statistical regularities 
or correlations in activity of those lower-level schemas.
So, to refer back to the angle study (Cohen & Younger 1984), an infant may initially 
process the two lines of a 45° angle as separate units in particular orientations, but because 
the two lines co-occur in the same relative spatial relationship, even when the angle is ro-
tated, the infant will eventually process the relationship among the lines, that is, the angle 
rather than the independent lines. 
3. Higher schemas serve as components for still-higher schemas.
The hierarchical nature of the system can account for development beyond the first few 
months of life. The process of integrating information to form a higher-level schema is 
itself repeated throughout development. Lower-level information can be integrated into a 
higher-level schema, which can in turn be integrated into an even higher-level schema, and 
so on.
To continue with the angle example, after connections have been formed between 
the two lines to form an angle, several angles and curves could then be integrated to form 
the complex shape of an object. That object could then be integrated with another object to 
form an event defined in terms of the relationship between the two objects.
4. There is a bias to process using highest-formed schemas.
Whereas the previous principles have described the learning mechanism, or the building of 
the hierarchy, this fourth principle describes what information an infant will attempt to pro-
cess after two or more layers of information units have been formed. Specifically, infants 
will tend to process the incoming information using the highest level available to them. 
Preferring a higher level does not mean that the lower-level information is unavailable, but 
rather that the most adaptive strategy for an infant is usually to process information at the 
highest possible level. The next principle describes what happens when that strategy fails.
5. If, for some reason, higher schemas are not available, lower-level schemas are utilized.
This principle describes the “fallback” described in section 1.1.2. A higher-level schema 
may be unavailable for a number of reasons, but it is often unavailable when the system 
gets overloaded. Circumstances for overloading the system can vary, but may include com-
plicating the input by adding irrelevant material or noise, or converting a simple object or 
event into a category of objects or events. A corollary of this principle is that if for some 
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reason the system does fall back to a lower level, it will then attempt to learn or accom-
modate so as to move back up to the next higher level.
6. This learning system applies throughout development and across domains.
A strength of any theory is that it can account for a variety of findings in a variety of do-
mains. This final principle highlights the domain-general nature of the proposed learning 
system. Although these principles were developed to explain how infants develop cogni-
tively, they are likely a great deal more general. They may, in fact, represent how we as 
humans become proficient or experts in a wide range of tasks throughout the life span. It 
just so happens that one of first tasks encountered by young infants is trying to make sense 
of the immediate physical and social world around them. These principles help them suc-
ceed at that task.
2.1.4  Conclusion
The Information Processing Principles (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002) describes 
a domain-general learning system that provides continuous learning from the environment, 
the application of learned schemas to achieve some goal, and a fallback method for grace-
ful recovery in the event of information overload. These are all features that are useful 
— perhaps vital — to robust autonomous robot control. A computational learning system 
that can capture these principles can be used by a robot for grounded and robust control. 
The goals of this dissertation are to build such a model, and apply it to a mobile robot for 
grounded, robust control. This model is presented in the next chapter.
2.2 Computer Science Foundations
The computational model presented in the next chapter uses a learning system called 
the Self-Organizing Map (SOM; Kohonen 1997) as a central module. Before a description 
of the new model can commence, the SOM is first described in this section. While other 
learning systems might work just as well as the SOM for this dissertation, the SOM is an 
appropriate tool for a variety reasons. These reasons, along with a technical description of 
the SOM, follow.
15
2.2.1 The Self-Organizing Map (SOM)
The Self-Organizing Map (SOM; Kohonen 1997) is an unsupervised learning sys-
tem that maps input data onto a feature coordinate system, or feature map. The input data 
is a collection of feature vectors that describe observations of the environment. The SOM 
itself consists of a map of interconnected nodes, where each node contains a reference vec-
tor mi = [µi1,µi2,...,µin]
T ∈ ℜn. The input vector x = [ξ1,ξ2,...,ξn]
T ∈ ℜn is connected to all the 
nodes i in parallel with through the weight vector µij.
For training, the SOM first finds a best matching node by first looking for the node 
whose reference vector is most similar to the input vector. To do this, the SOM utilizes 
a distance metric d to determine the similarity of an input vector x with a given node mi. 
Usually, a standard Euclidean distance ||x - mi|| is used, but there are a variety of distance 
metrics that could be used for their particular properties.
The distance metric is used to find the closest node mc, sometimes called the “win-
ning node.” Locating the winning node is done by finding c such that:
 c x m
i i
= −argmin . 2.2
During learning, the winning node is selected and becomes the focal point for the 
modification of the reference vectors. The nodes in the SOM are made to approach the input 
vector proportional to the nodeʼs topological distance to the winning node in the SOM:
 m t m t t h t x t m ti i ci i( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+ = + ⋅ −[ ]1 α , 2.3
where t is an integer discrete-time coordinate, α is the learning rate, and hci is a neighbor-
hood function. hci determines how the rate of change falls off as the distance to the winning 
node increases. A simple neighborhood function would define a set of nodes around the 
winning node that would receive training, while nodes outside this set would be unchanged. 
Another method, used in this dissertation, defines the neighborhood function using a Gauss-














To facilitate convergence of the SOM, α → 0 and hci → 0 as t → ∞.
2.2.2 Features of the SOM
As the SOM is trained on input vectors, the reference vectors come to represent 
clusters of the feature vectors that exist in the environment. In other words, the reference 
vectors become prototypes for the stimuli of the input vectors. The SOM is a learning sys-
tem for generating prototypes from the environment without the use of a corrective error 
signal — in other words, it is unsupervised.
The SOM is also sensitive to frequency in the input set. Similar stimuli that are pre-
sented more frequently will get more representation in the SOM, which a greater number 
of nodes to that stimulus cluster. Each prototype represents a subset of the input vectors 
proportional to its frequency in the environment, so more frequent stimuli will be classified 
with greater accuracy. The SOM effectively magnifies dense clusters to provide differentia-
tion where it is most needed.
The neighborhood effect of the SOM results in similar prototypes being topologi-
cally proximal. Insofar as the distance metric measures the similarity of the stimuli, clus-
ters of nodes will represent a family of similar features in the environment.
Finally, the SOM is rooted in a body of supporting psychological and neurological 
evidence. There have been many studies comparing the SOM to cortical maps of neu-
rons. And the SOM has been used to successfully model many psychological phenomena, 
including vision, audition, voicing and language (for an overview of this evidence, see 
Kohonen 1997).
2.2.3 The SOM for Cognitive Development
The SOMʼs ability to generate prototypes unsupervised makes it highly suitable for 
modeling cognition. First, the SOM provides a reasonable and psychologically supported 
way of finding correlations among features in the environment, making the SOM a useful 
tool for building schemas.
The Information Processing Principles appear to describe a self-organizing learn-
ing system. Nothing in the principles rules out the use of a supervised learning system, 
but neither do they mention any attributes specific to supervised learning systems, such 
as normative feedback or error correction. Also, some systems using normative feedback 
have been criticized when applied to some domains of infant cognitive development (this 
is discussed in more detail in section 4.5.1). While supervised learning systems may work 
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well as a model of cognitive development, the SOM does not rest on this assumption. Addi-
tionally, using the SOM avoids the criticism (fair or not) that a supervised learning system 
would receive.
The SOMʼs neural plausibility also makes it a good candidate for a model of infant 
cognition. While it is not necessary for the model to be neurally plausible in order to be 
psychologically valid, it does address the concerns of many critics who are wary of ground-
less psychological models. The SOMʼs neural plausibility makes it — and anything built 
with it — more attractive and influential in infant cognition, and psychology in general, 
than a learning system that has no relation to neuroscience.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter presented the two scientific foundations of the research in this dis-
sertation. First, a body of research on infant cognition suggests an information processing 
mechanism for cognitive development. This mechanism builds a hierarchy of knowledge 
by observing the environment, it is domain general, and it provides a fallback mechanism 
for graceful recovery in the event of overload. Second, the SOM provides an unsuper-
vised learning system for building prototypes through observations of the environment. 
The SOM is an unsupervised, neurally plausible correlation learning system, making it a 
desirable system to use in a cognitive model.
A computational model of infant cognitive development — specifically the Infor-
mation Processing Principles — can be used to give a robot grounded, robust autonomous 
control. The SOM goes a long way towards implementing the Information Processing Prin-
ciples, but is missing certain key features. In the next chapter, these features are addressed 
and a computational model of the Information Processing Principles using the SOM is 
presented.
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3. The Constructivist Learning Architecture
The Constructivist Learning Architecture (CLA, pronounced “clay” as in “model-
ing clay”) is a learning system that models infant cognitive development and provides 
adaptive, robust control for autonomous robots. To make CLA a model of infant cognitive 
development, CLA implements the Information Processing Principles presented in Chapter 
2, which were derived from an extensive analysis of infant cognition studies. By basing 
CLA on the Information Processing Principles, CLA can replicate studies of infant cogni-
tion, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4. Further chapters will show that such a learning 
system can be used to control an autonomous agent (Chapter 5) and develop robust control 
while learning from delayed rewards (Chapter 6).
This chapter contains a detailed description of the design and implementation of 
CLA, the main contribution of this dissertation. The first section addresses the design de-
cisions that were made for building CLA. The second section describes the CLA imple-
mentation, including activation and training algorithms. The final section explores CLA̓ s 
ability to model different information architectures.
3.1 The CLA Design
The goal of CLA is to implement a model of constructivist learning in infants that 
can be utilized as a robot controller. The motivation behind this goal is to create a system 
that captures the adaptability and robustness of infants and apply these features to mobile 
robot control. To make CLA a model of constructivist learning, CLA is implemented using 
the Information Processing Principles (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002) as a design speci-
fication.
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Such a system is necessarily hierarchical. Principles 2 and 3 describe a system where 
schemas are processed and become new schemas, which suggests not only a hierarchy, but 
one where the inputs and the outputs have the same representation type. Principles 4 and 5 
describe the ability to utilize different levels of the representation as needed, meaning that 
the implementation cannot throw away the lower schemas once the newer schemas are cre-
ated. So the implementation must be a persistent hierarchy of interconnected modules.
The Self Organizing Map (SOM) (Kohonen 1997) was chosen as the basis for the 
implementation of CLA because it is an unsupervised, neurologically plausible system 
for learning prototypes, as discussed in the previous chapter. But the SOM by itself is not 
enough to implement the Information Processing Principles. In particular, the SOM is a 
flat learning system that projects the feature space of the stimuli onto a two-dimensional 
space. Additional work must be done to give the SOM the ability to build a hierarchical 
knowledge base.
3.2 CLA Implementation
The challenge of making the SOM hierarchical lies in the problem of how to gener-
ate output from a SOM that can be used as meaningful input to another SOM. The approach 
used here is to use the nodes of a trained SOM as new feature detectors, similar to those 
used in the raw stimuli. Since nodes have prototypes that represent features in the environ-
ment, a node can be used as a detector for the specific combination of features described by 
the nodeʼs prototype. The node would then produce an activation indicating the stimulus  ̓
similarity to the nodeʼs prototype, from 0.0 (totally dissimilar) to 1.0 (identical).
The SOM already uses a similarity function for training. This similarity function 



















Formula 3.1 produces a value closer to 1.0 when the stimulus and the prototype are similar, 
and closer to 0.0 as the two grow further apart. The σ parameter can be used to control how 
fast activation drops off as the stimulus and the prototype grow more dissimilar. When a 
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stimulus is presented to a SOM in CLA, Formula 3.1 is used to create the activation vector 
a. The activation vector is a new representation of the stimulus in terms of the prototypes 
m. Sometimes, a stimulus will activate a single node whose prototype represents the stimu-
lus very accurately. Other times, a stimulus will activate multiple nodes more weakly, if no 
one node accurately represents the stimulus, but some nodes are similar to aspects of the 
stimulus. Together, the prototypes m along with its activation vector a are called a “CLA 
Layer.”
The activation vector now can be used similar to the input vector that SOM uses as 
a stimulus. For this purpose, a new CLA layer is created whose prototypes have the same 
ordinality as the activation vector of the original layer. The activation vector then becomes 
a new stimulus that is input to this new higher layer. The higher layer can now organize 
prototypes from the activation vector of the lower layer. In this way, CLA layers can be 
stacked one on top of the other (Figure 3.1).
To train CLA, activation must be propagated from the bottom layer to the top layer 
before any training can happen. However, the necessary computation of comparing the 
stimulus to the prototypes is already done as a precursor to the training step. As a layer 
receives an input stimulus and scans the SOM for the winning node, all distances are con-
verted to an activation using Formula 3.1 and stored. This activation process continues up 
the layers until they have all been activated.





Figure 3.1: A CLA example. An example schematic of a simple CLA configuration. This CLA has two 
layers. The raw stimulus is presented to Layer 1 and compared to the prototypes in each node. Those with 
dissimilar prototypes have a low activation (indicated by a dark color in the node). Nodes with similar 
prototypes have a high activation (indicated by a light color). Activations of Layer 1 become the stimulus 
to Layer 2. Layer 2 prototypes are compared and the nodes are activates, just as in Level 1. Using the 
prototypes in a layer as feature detectors allows an arbitrary number of SOM layers to be connected into a 
hierarchy.
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At this point, the standard training described in Chapter 2 can take place. Each layer 
is trained on the activation vector of the lower layer, except for the lowest layer which 
trains on raw stimuli.
3.3 CLA Structures
Because the SOM has already projected the feature space onto a two-dimensional 
feature map, simply adding another layer on top of this will not learn anything new. Any 
additional layers will only re-represent the same information. However, CLA also supports 
more complex structures that introduce new information to each layer. Three examples of 
these structures — tree structure, time-delay structure, and recurrent structure — are de-
scribed below.
CLA can organize layers in a tree structure, allowing a higher layer to receive acti-
vations from more than one lower layers. In this case, the higher layerʼs prototypes are a list 
of vectors, each matching the activation vector of each of the input layers. This technique 
can be used to integrate different sources of information, such as multi-model information. 
This structure is used in all of the experiments in the following three chapters.
CLA can also organize the layers to introduce a time delay between layers. With a 
time delay, the activation vector of a lower layer is held for one or more time steps before 
it is introduced to the higher layer. By itself, a time delay does not impact the system much, 
but the time delay can be combined with the tree structure to present a higher layer with 
the activation of a lower layer at multiple time steps. Such a technique can be used, for 
example, to create a “sliding window” of activation. This technique is used in the first ap-
plication chapter, following this one.
CLA can also used the time delayed layer to build a recurrent layer structure. In this 
case, a higher layerʼs activation vector can be input to a lower layer so that the layer con-
nections form a loop. This structure cannot be implemented without a time delay. The re-
current CLA structure can be used to build systems similar to Simple Recurrent Networks 
(section 4.5.1) that find structure in time. None of the experiments in this dissertation use a 
recurrent structure, but it is an important capability for CLA to support for future applica-
tions.
These are only three of a number of possible configurations of CLA. The right 
configuration will depend on the needs of the modeler. CLA is flexible enough to represent 
multiple levels of information using multiple information structures.
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3.4 Fallback in CLA
While the previous sections describe how CLA builds a hierarchy of representa-
tions, addressing Information Processing Principles 2 and 3, this section describes how to 
address the functionality of principles 4 and 5, also known as fallback (described in section 
1.1.2). According to the principles, fallback should occur when the highest level is over-
loaded, either by complex, unfamiliar or noisy information. Fallback is a useful technique 
that gives robots the ability to respond to changes in the environment or its own sensorimo-
tor configuration by gracefully degrading in performance, rather than failing outright.
Implementing fallback in CLA is a simple procedure. CLA stores its knowledge in 
a hierarchy of layers, where each layer contains a set of prototypes. When CLA detects that 
the top layer or layers are overloaded, or that they otherwise cannot handle the stimulus, 
then CLA simply ignores the activation of the top layer and uses the activation of the next 
highest layer. The challenge, then, is to detect an overload and trigger the fallback mecha-
nism.
With CLA, overload is defined to be the situation where the stimulus presented to 
a layer is underrepresented by the learned prototypes. In other words, a layer is overloaded 
when it receives a stimulus on which it has never been trained. This happens under three 
circumstances: (1) the layer is untrained, (2) the environment has changed or the agent has 
entered a new part of the environment with new information, or (3) the agentʼs sensory ap-
paratus has been altered either through damage or — in the case of an infant — growth.
Keep in mind that a layer represents one level of prototypes, so a stimulus that is fa-
miliar for one layer may be novel for another layer. Using the typing fallback example from 
section 1.1.2, consider that CLA has been trained on typing with a QWERTY keyboard. 
CLA would learn, say, prototypes that describe how to press keyboard keys at one level, 
and prototypes describing the relative location of the keys at another higher level. If this 
trained CLA was then confronted with a Dvorak keyboard, the stimulus would be novel to 
the higher level, since all the keys are in a new place. The information about the relative 
key positions of the Dvorak keyboard would be underrepresented in the higher level. But 
the keys are still pressed in the same way, and so the prototypes at the lower level are still 
applicable. The multi-level representation of CLA is what allows fallback to work: when 
higher-level representations fail to represent the stimulus, then lower-level representations 
are used as a backup.
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There are two techniques for detecting overload used in this dissertation. One way 
to detect overload is using a measure of total activation for a layer. The total activation 
would be the sum of the activation vector from a given layer. During training, each layer 
can store the minimum total activation that is generated from the stimuli. This measure is 
used as a threshold that indicates normal activation for a layer. When the total activation 
drops below this threshold, then this would indicate that the present stimulus is overloading 
the layer, and CLA should use a lower layer whose activation is above its threshold. This 
technique is good for propositional schemas, and is used in the experiments in Chapter 4.
An alternative method can be used if the learned schemas are sensorimotor schemas. 
In this case, there may be some indication as to the success or failure of the schemas that 
are activated. The reliability rate of the schemas are tracked and stored with the prototypes 
during normal operation. After training, CLA keeps track of the average reliability of all 
the sensorimotor schemas in a layer. If the average reliability of a layerʼs schemas drops 
below a certain percentage, this indicates that the layer is overloaded, and a lower layer 
that is more reliable should be used. This technique is used in the experiments in Chapter 
6, where it is also described in more detail.
These are just two techniques to detect an information overload and trigger the fall-
back effect, and there may be other techniques as well. CLA can support these and other 
approaches because CLA builds and maintains a hierarchical knowledge structure where 
any level of knowledge can be utilized when needed.
3.5 Conclusion
CLA is an implementation of the Information Processing Principles. It builds a 
hierarchical knowledge base from basic observations using interconnected SOMs com-
municate using activation vectors. CLA supports tree structures, time delay structures and 
recurrent structures. It also supports fallback, a useful technique for robust robotics.
The central thesis of this dissertation is that a model of infant cognitive develop-
ment can give a robot the ability to learn grounded, robust control. CLA is such a model. 
The next chapter will demonstrate that CLA models infant cognitive development. Chap-
ter 5 demonstrates that CLA can learn sensorimotor schemas in addition to propositional 
schemas. And Chapter 6 shows that CLA can be used as a grounded, robust controller for 
a mobile robot.
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4. Cognitive Development Model
The previous chapter introduced CLA, an adaptive robot controller that provides 
robust autonomy by modeling infant cognitive development. The central thesis of this dis-
sertation is that a constructivist model of infant cognition can be used to provide an au-
tonomous agent with robust control. In this chapter, we demonstrate CLA̓ s ability to model 
infant cognition by using CLA to replicate a set of studies in the acquisition of causal 
perception, an important and challenging area in cognition. In the following chapters, CLA 
will be applied to autonomous robotics (Chapter 5) and learning with delayed rewards 
(Chapter 6).
The goal of the experiments described in this chapter is to demonstrate that CLA 
can accurately model infant cognitive development. Specifically, CLA learns to identify 
billiard ball launching events as causal events. It does this using constructivist learning, 
starting with a simple component view of the events and building a higher-level causal 
view. Moreover, CLA demonstrates its ability to degrade gracefully. When presented with 
a complex event, CLA does not fail completely, but falls back to a simpler representation. 
Fallback, the ability to drop back to a lower level of knowledge when the higher levels fail 
(section 2.1.3), is an important aspect of constructivism, and specifically the Information 
Processing Principles (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002). Fallback is used later in Chapter 6 
for robust control. Following the experiments, a body of similar work in models of infant 
cognitive development is reviewed.
4.1 Causal Perception
Causality is an excellent domain to demonstrate CLA as a cognitive model. First, 
there is a wealth of data on this subject in experimental psychology, particularly many 
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recent studies in infant acquisition of causal understanding. Also, it is a complex, time-ori-
ented domain that pushes the limits of any learning system. Causal events are not simply 
images or snapshots of images at one time, but are continuous and take place over many 
steps. Above all, causality is an ancient problem that has been at the center of modern 
philosophical debate since Hume (1777/1993), whoʼs “blank slate” approach proposed that 
all knowledge is learned, and Kant (1794/1982), who insisted that certain concepts, par-
ticularly causality, could not be learned and therefore must be innate. A model of causality 
using CLA is not only a rigorous test of a learning system, it could also make a valuable 
contribution to a centuries-old psychological and philosophical debate.
4.1.1 Causal Perception in Adults
This experiment, like many contemporary studies of causality (described in the 
next subsection), uses a set of events first developed by Michotte (1963). Michotte ex-
plored causal perception in adults using simplified billiard-ball collisions, called launching 
events (see Figure 4.1 for a schematic of these events). Michotte found that adults pre-
sented with a simple direct launching event would describe the event as causal. He could 
then alter the likelihood that subjects would identify the event as causal by altering two 
components of the event. He could either introduce a delay at the moment of the collision, 
or a gap between the two balls at the point of collision, or both. He found that manipulating 
the temporal component of the event (increasing the delay) or the spatial component of the 
event (increasing the gap) reduced the likelihood that the subjects would identify the event 
as causal.
Direct Delay Gap Delay+Gap
Figure 4.1: Launching events. Schematics of the four different launching events used by Michotte (1963) 
to study causal perception in adults. The Direct event is the normal occurrence when one billiard ball hits 
another. The Delay event introduces a delay at the moment of collision. The Gap event has the balls “col-
lide” when they are still apart. The Delay+Gap event has the combined features of the Delay and Gap 
events. These same events are used in habituation studies to detect causal perception in infants.
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4.1.2 Causal Perception in Infants
Leslie (1984) used this same approach to identify causal perception in infants. He 
used a habituation paradigm to determine whether infants were attending to the spatial and 
temporal components of the events, or the causality of the events. Leslie placed the four 
events on a theoretical 2 × 2 grid (Figure 4.2) and tested infants using a habituation study 
that compared events across the diagonals of the grid. In other words, some infants were 
habituated to a Direct event and tested on a Delay+Gap event (or vice versa). Other infants 
were habituated to a Delay event and tested on a Gap event (or vice versa). Leslie reasoned 
that, if infants had a component view of the events, and they were just responding perceptu-
ally in terms of the spatial and temporal properties of the events, then dishabituation along 
one diagonal should be similar to dishabituation along another diagonal, because both pairs 
of events involve the same change in both components. However, if infants had a causal 
view of the events, then dishabituation along the Direct-to-Delay+Gap diagonal should 
be greater than along the Delay-to-Gap diagonal, because only the Direct event is causal. 
Leslie found that 6.5-month-old infants did, in fact, respond to the events in accordance 
with the causal view.
Further, Cohen and Amsel (1998) used a similar paradigm and found interesting 
developmental changes in infants  ̓ responses to causality. Rather than test across the di-
agonals, Cohen and Amsel compared dishabituation between Gap and Direct events with 










Figure 4.2: Launching events viewed as components. The four launching events placed on two axes: a 
spatial axis representing a difference in spatial features, and a temporal axis representing a difference in 
temporal features. Infants using the component view should dishabituate equally along the diagonals, while 
infants using a causal view should dishabituate more between Direct and. non-Direct events than between 
two non-Direct events.
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sality they should have dishabituated more when going from the Gap to Direct event, be-
cause that difference includes a change in causality. Cohen and Amsel found that 6.25-
month-olds did respond to the events causally, thus replicating Leslie. However, they also 
found that 5.5- and 4-month-olds responded to the events in a way more consistent with a 
component view. Four-month-old infants were sensitive mainly to the duration of move-
ment in the event, whereas 5.5-month-old infants were also sensitive to the spatial and 
temporal components. Neither age responded in terms of the causality. These results pro-
vide an indication of a developmental shift in causal understanding that progresses from a 
component view to a higher-level causal view.
4.2 Modeling Causal Acquisition with CLA
While the studies described above suggest a simple progression from one stage 
to another, the Information Processing Principles hypothesize a relationship between the 
component view and the causal view. These stages do not occur sequentially and inde-
pendent of one another. Rather, the component view is used to build the causal view. The 
challenge of a constructivist model of causal perception is not just to learn causality, but to 
learn causality from its components.
To model the part-to-whole progression of causal acquisition, CLA is designed to 
first learn a component view of causal events and then to use this knowledge to learn cau-
sality. Cohen and Amsel (1998) demonstrated that younger infants see launching events as 
components so, accordingly, the model is trained on the spatial and temporal components 
of launching events. The two different components are presented to CLA simultaneously 
using two separate representations. See Figure 4.3 for a diagram of example inputs.
The first representation, the Position Input, captures the spatial information of the 
event and excludes any temporal information. At each time step of the launching events, 
the position of each of the two balls are represented on a 20-element vector. A ball starting 
at the far left would be represented by the first element being set to 1.0, while another ball 
waiting to be struck at the center of the screen would be represented by the 11th element 
being set to 1.0. There are always 2 elements in this vector set to 1.0, while the rest are set 
to 0.0. These positions are presented as snapshots to the learning system.
The second representation, the Speed Input, captures the temporal information of 
the event and excludes any spatial information. The speed of each ball is represented with 
a 10-element vector acting as a speedometer for each ball. When a ball is still, the first 
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element is set to 1.0 while all other elements are set to 0.0. As the ball accelerates, more 
elements are set to 1.0 starting with the second, then the third, and so on. Each ballʼs speed 
is represented by its own vector so that both balls are represented with a 2-by-10 Speed 
Matrix. Moreover, to further capture the temporal elements of this event, a sliding window 
of three consecutive snapshots of the Speed Matrix are collected and used as the final 
Speed Input.
The first experiment, a model of the acquisition of causal perception, is not meant to 
suggest that infants process causal events with such a stark and austere separation between 
the spatial and temporal components. However, we do know that infants have access to this 
information and process them separately to some degree. They are strongly separated in 
this experiment to test the hypothesis that the causal event can be learned from the compo-
nents. If anything, this extreme separation should make learning causality more difficult.
The inputs are presented simultaneously to CLA, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Each 
separate representation is presented to a separate SOM layer simultaneously. The Position 
Input is presented to the Position Layer, and the Movement Input is presented to the Move-
ment Layer. Collectively, these layers comprise Level 1, which should learn a component 
view of the events. These second-level layers come to represent, as prototypes, the dif-
ferent positions and speeds over the course of an entire event. So, for example, different 
regions of the Position Layer would represent the balls being far apart, close together, or 
Position Input Event Step Movement Input
Figure 4.3: Launching event input. The Position and Movement Input for three steps in a Direct launch-
ing event. Each element is either 0.0 (black) or 1.0 (white). The Position input represents the position of 
the balls, but not the temporal aspects. The Movement Input represents the speed of the ball, but not the 
spatial aspects. A sliding window of three consecutive Movement Inputs are presented to CLA, which can 
then capture the change in movement (acceleration). They are presented to the learning system separately 
to address the challenge of learning the causal view from the components of the launching events.
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touching. Different regions of the Movement Layer would represent both balls stationary, 
or only the first ball moving, or only the second ball moving.
The Top Layer of the model receives inputs from both the Position and Movement 
layers. It will represent the event as a whole and, after training, distinguish causal from 
non-causal events.
4.3 Experiment 1: Acquisition of Causal Perception
The first experiment uses the inputs and architecture described above to replicate 
the results from the studies of infant perception and acquisition of causal perception by 
Leslie (1984) and Cohen & Amsel (1998). In doing do, CLA is demonstrated to model 
cognitive development in infants. More specifically, CLA is shown not only to learn causal 
perception, but to learn causal perception in the same way that infants learn it: by construc-












Movement Input Position Input
Figure 4.4: CLA design for learning causality. The Movement Input and Position Input are presented 
to the Movement and Position layers, respectively. The activations from these layers in Level 1 are then 
presented to the Top Layer in Level 2. Level 1 is expected to develop a component view of the launching 
event, while Level 2 is expected to develop a causal view.
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in the next experiment, and operate as a robust controller of robots in the following two 
chapters.
4.3.1 Training Parameters and Measurement
During training, each event was presented to the model at a frequency using a gross 
estimate of its relative frequency in nature. Based on these estimates, Direct events were 
presented 85% of the time and each of the other events (Delay, Gap, and Delay+Gap) were 
presented 5% of the time. It is postulated that the frequency of experiencing these events, 
while certainly not the only information used by infants, plays a crucial role in the acquisi-
tion of causal understanding. If the world consisted mostly of Delay events, for example, 
infants would develop a radically different view of causality.
4.3.2 Level 1: Component View
As each layer received more training, different prototypes in each layer came to 
represent the launching events at different points in time. If all of the activations from all 
the time steps are added together, we get a composite activation graph showing all the pro-
totypes that were activated during the event. Figure 4.5A shows the composite activation 
A: Position Composites B: Movement Composites
Figure 4.5: Activation composites of Level 1 layers for all four events. Each graph shows the composite 
activation across a launching event. The composite is the sum of all activation at every node. The compos-
ites for the Position Layer (A) is on the left, and the Movement Layer (B) is on the right. For each of these, 
the graph represents, starting with the top left and moving clockwise, the Direct, Delay, Delay+Gap and 
Gap events. These composites show that the Level 1 layers have learned the components of the launching 
events. (There is a section of the Delay nodes that does not activate for the Delay+Gap event, although the 
active nodes are clearly a subset of the active nodes for the Delay event. A possible explanation for the dif-
ferent is discussed below in section 4.3.5, “A Causal Continuum.”)
31
in the Position Layer for all four events. Although there is a clear distinction in the activa-
tion patterns between events that have a gap and events with no gap, there is no distinction 
between Delay events and non-Delay events. This activation pattern reflects that certain 
prototypes have specialized to represent the presence or absence of a Gap, but not of a De-
lay. Conversely, Figure 4.5B shows the exact opposite pattern for events in the Movement 
Layer. There are specialized prototypes for the presence and absence of a Delay, but not a 
Gap. The lower-level layers are working as they were designed, reflecting the components 
of the event.
4.3.3 Level 2: Causal View
The composite activation graphs for the Top Layer in Figure 4.6 show no such sym-
metry. While the lower levels had prototypes that specialized for the components of the 
launching events, the Top Layer has prototypes that specialize for the events themselves. 
To identify which prototypes have specialized for which events, we can generate an “iso-
late” graph by taking the composite for a given event and subtracting out the composites 
for the other three events. (This procedure is similar to the process used when making an 
Top Composites Top Isolates
Figure 4.6: Activation composites and isolates for the Top Layer. The graphs on the left show the com-
posite activation at the Top Layer for the Direct, Delay, Delay+Gap and Gap events. There are differences 
in both axes, indicating that each event has its own representation. The four graphs on the right show the 
activation isolates — nodes that are active only for a single event — at the Top Layer for the Direct, Delay, 
Delay+Gap and Gap events. There are nodes that only activate for the Direct event, but there are no such 
nodes for the Gap or Delay events, demonstrating that the Top Layer has a special representation for the 
Direct event that doesnʼt exist in the lower levels. (See section 4.5.3 for a discussion of the specialized 
nodes in the Delay+Gap event.)
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fMRI; Horowitz 1995.) The results of this subtraction can also be seen in Figure 4.6. As 
the figure shows, there are specialized prototypes that activate exclusively during a Direct 
event, although there are no such specialized prototypes for Delay and Gap events. The 
presence of specialized prototypes shows that the Top Layer has created a unique represen-
tation for the causal event that does not exist for other non-causal events. The specialized 
prototypes that appear for the Delay + Gap event also fit the predictions of Leslie (1984) in 
an unexpected way and will be discussed in more detail in section 4.3.5.
4.3.4 Comparison to Infant Experiments
To compare these results with the average infant looking times found by Leslie 
(1984) and Cohen and Amsel (1998), the looking times are compared to the difference in 
activation between pairs of events. To get the difference in activation, the composite of 
one event is subtracted from the composite of another event, and the resulting differences 
in activation are then added together. This procedure gives the sum value of all the node 
activations that occur in one event and not another and gives us a meaningful measure 
of novelty. The results of these comparisons for the events used by Leslie (1984) can be 
seen in Figure 4.7. The difference in activation is significantly greater between the causal 
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Direct - Gap Delay - Gap
Figure 4.7: Difference in total activation at the Top Layer between events. Each bar represents the dif-
ference in the total activation of the Top Layer across an entire event. On the left, the event pairs are taken 
from Leslie (1984): Direct to Delay+Gap (a causal difference) and Delay-Gap (no causal difference). On 
the right, the event pairs are from Cohen and Amsel (1998): Direct-Delay (a causal difference) and Delay-
Gap (no causal difference). In both cases, the change in causality resulted in a significantly higher differ-
ence, just as with infants.
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non-causal events (Delay and Gap) (M = 5.38, S.D. = 1.00), t(6) = 5.58, P = .002 (two-
tailed), d = 4.28.
This pattern of results is consistent with the difference in looking times found by 
Leslie, who considered his results to be evidence for infant causal perception. A similar 
pattern of results was found by Cohen and Amsel (1998), who also took their findings as 
evidence for infant causal perception. Again, our model produced activation levels consis-
tent with the empirical data. As seen in Figure 4.7, the activation difference is significantly 
greater between the causal (Direct) and non-causal (Gap) events (M = 8.20, S.D. = 0.56) 
than between the two non-causal events (Delay and Gap) (M = 5.38, S.D. = 1.00), t(6) = 
4.93, P = .005 (two-tailed), d = 2.82.
4.3.5 A Causal Continuum
The modelʼs treatment of the Delay+Gap event was an unexpected surprise. Rather 
than just building specialized prototypes for the Direct event, the Top Layer also built 
specialized prototypes for the Delay+Gap event (Figure 4.7). In effect, the model did not 
just represent events in terms of “causal” or not, but on a continuum from “causal” to “less 
causal” to “not causal.” The layer nodes that exclusively represent the Delay+Gap event 
allow the system to view these events as less causal then an event with just a Delay or Gap 
by itself. Such a continuum was first proposed in adults by Michotte (1963) and in infants 
by Leslie and Keeble (1987). Figure 4.8 is a reproduction of Leslie and Keebleʼs (1987) 
“spatiotemporal continuity.” It is wholly compatible with CLA̓ s results, placing the Direct 





Figure 4.8: Spatiotemporal continuity of launching events. Taken from Leslie and Keeble (1987), who 
proposed this causal view of the launching events. As opposed to Figure 4.2, where events are compared 
by their components, the spatiotemporal continuity has a single dimension: causality. They posited that 
infants with a causal view would respond to events using this continuity, responding only to differences in 
the causality of the event. (Leslie and Keeble offered no evidence or rationale for the order of the Gap and 
Delay events in the middle, and so the order is assumed to be arbitrary.) Without setting out to do so, CLA 
has reproduced this phenomenon.
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4.3.6 Stage-Like Development
The model also provides evidence of stage-like development. In Figure 4.9, we can 
see the composite activation for the Direct event in the three layers at different points in 
training. Although the lower Position and Movement Layers begin to form immediately, 
and start to settle at about 4500 epochs, it is not until this point that the Top Layer begins 
to form. This is a consequence of CLA̓ s hierarchical design. Higher layers are organizing 
patterns of activity in lower layers, but they cannot organize anything consistently until the 
lower layers are stable. Even though CLA uses a continuous learning system, the develop-
ment progresses in stages from one level (the component view) to the next level (the causal 
view). Stage-like cognitive development in infants was first proposed by Piaget (1937) and 
is consistent with Cohen and Amselʼs (1998) results that infants at different ages process 
the same events differently.
4.3.7 Conclusion
In this experiment, CLA learned a causal view of launching events. It learned this 
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Figure 4.9: Stage-like development of causality. Composite activation of the Position, Movement and 
Top layers for a Direct event at different points in training. While the lower layers begin to settle on an 
activation pattern at around 4500 training epochs, it is not until this point that the top layer begins to form 
any representations. This demonstrates that, even through all layers use the same learning algorithm, higher 
levels do not form representations until the lower levels have settled on a representation. This stage-like 
development was first proposed by Piaget.
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layer. The progression from a component view to a causal view replicates the results of 
studies by Leslie (1984) and Cohen & Amsel (1998) demonstrating the presence and ac-
quisition of causality by infants. The events learned by CLA lie along a Causal Continuum, 
which is consistent with the results of Leslie and Keeble (1987). And CLA learns causality 
in stages, not all at once, which is also consistent with Piagetʼs (1998) observation of stage-
like development in infant cognition.
In summary, this experiment demonstrated that CLA builds a hierarchy of knowl-
edge in the same way as infants. The Information Processing Principles state that such a 
hierarchy should also be able to fall back, meaning it should respond to information over-
load at the top levels by utilizing layers at lower levels. CLA is shown to have this property 
in the next experiment.
4.4 Experiment 2: Fallback During Overload
While the previous experiment demonstrated that CLA models constructivist learn-
ing, it is also important that CLA can handle noise and overload robustly using fallback 
(section 1.1.2). Recall that fallback is described by Information Processing Principles 4 & 
5: The learning system prefers to process information at the highest level, but should higher 
schemas be unavailable, lower schemas are still be available to process the stimulus. Fall-
back is important because it is what allows CLA to operate as a robust controller for mobile 
robots, as demonstrated in Chapter 6.
In section 1.1.2, fallback was illustrated by noting that an experienced typist, when 
confronted with a different keyboard layout, will regress to an earlier skill level but even-
tually recover full typing skills. Cohen and Oakes (1993) demonstrated the fallback phe-
nomenon in infants. They found that 10-month-olds, who had no problem viewing causal 
events when the objects were simple toy cars, could not process causal events in the same 
way if the toy cars changed from trial to trial during habituation. Even though the infants 
were receiving the same spatial and temporal information,  10-month-olds processed these 
events with a component view, just as 4-month-olds process causal events. It was as if the 
10-month-olds had regressed to an earlier stage of causal perception. As they grew older, 
however, infants eventually began to process these events as causal. Cohen and Oakes 
concluded that the changing agents in the launching events had introduced a categoriza-
tion task, making it difficult for the infants. Eventually, however, the infants were able to 
integrate the more complicated information into their higher-level view.
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In this experiment, CLA demonstrates that it not only learns like infants, but it fails 
like them too. When presented with a stimulus that is noisy or complex, CLA will still 
be able to process the event at a lower level. CLA has the ability to fall back because the 
higher-level learning is not destructive to the lower levels. The lower levels remain in place 
to be utilized should the higher levels fail.
4.4.1 Input Vectors for The Noisy Event
To see evidence for fallback, CLA is tested on a Noisy launching event, in which 
the speed varied throughout the event, and the position of the moving balls move forward 
irregularly, as if the balls were elliptical. This is a novel event for the trained model. It bears 
some resemblance to a direct causal event, but there is enough variation to make it difficult 
to identify as such. It is hypothesized that the lower level should receive some activation, 
while the higher levelʼs activation should be muted.
The Noisy event was presented to a CLA trained in the method described above. 
Composite activation matrices were created for the Position, Movement and Top layers for 
the Noisy event.
4.4.2 Network Response
The composite matrices are shown in Figure 4.10. The lower level layers largely 
respond to the Noisy event as if it were a direct event, although there are some notable gaps 
in the activation. However, the Top layerʼs activation is greatly diminished, indicating that 
there is little response at this higher level. A system that used these activations would fail to 
Composites for the Noisy Event
TopPositionMovement
Figure 4.10: Activation composites for the Noisy event. Graphs of the activation composite matrices 
for over the Noisy launching event in the Movement, Position and Top layers. While the lower layers can 
largely recognise the Noisy event as a launching event, the Top layer has very little activation. The Noisy 
event is difficult to recognize as a causal event, but the CLA still responds to the eventʼs spatial and tem-
poral components.
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recognize this event as a causal event, but would still be able to respond to this event using 
the components of the event.
4.4.3 Experiment 2 Discussion
CLA was shown to exhibit the ability to fall back when presented with a Noisy 
event. These results are consistent with Cohen and Oakes (1993), and further demonstrate 
that CLA is a model of infant cognitive development and processing. From a robotics 
point of view, these results show that CLA will not fail completely when confronted with a 
change in the environment, but will only suffer a partial regression and degrade gracefully 
(like the typist in section 1.1.2).
4.5 Related Work
Computational models of cognitive development have become a cottage industry 
in psychology, and they are having an effect on the study of cognitive development (see 
Elman et al 1996). This section reviews contemporary research in this area, with a compari-
son to CLA, the Information Processing Principles, and the work presented in this chapter. 
The majority of these models use some variant of the feedforward neural network, which 
is covered first. Other approaches are discussed as well, including self-organizing models, 
reinforcement learning, and the schema mechanism.
4.5.1 Feedforward Neural Networks
Feedforward neural networks are by far the most popular tool for contemporary 
models of cognitive development, driven largely by the appeal of a physiologically based 
system being used to produce (and reproduce) psychological phenomena. Feedforward 
networks use interconnected nodes to process sensory information. The sense vector is 
presented to the system as a set of input nodes. These nodes are connected by a set of 
weights to a layer of hidden nodes. Finally, the hidden layer is connected via another set of 
weights to an output layer. By processing input through two layers of weights, the system 
can produce non-linear output. 
There are several features common to all the feedforward models discussed in this 
section that set it apart from CLA. First, they are all supervised learning systems. In order 
for any feedforward network to learn, the learning system must use corrective feedback 
or an error signal. This error signal is used to adjust the weights of the network so that an 
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input will produce the appropriate output. For many domains of cognitive development, 
the source of an error signal in the environment is not entirely clear, causing this approach 
to be controversial. CLA, on the other hand, is an unsupervised learning system. CLA does 
not use an error signal, but categorizes all of the inputs against each other using only their 
features.
Second, all the systems below use the backpropagation learning algorithm for 
multi-layer neural networks. Training multi-layer networks is not obvious, and the method 
for doing so was not available until the mid 1980s. The backpropagation learning algorithm 
solves the weight setting problem mathematically, but it is agreed that this learning algo-
rithm is not an accurate model of how learning actually occurs in the brain. While neural 
plausibility is not crucial to this thesis, it is important to infant cognition researchers, mak-
ing the backpropagation algorithm an Achilles  ̓Heel to many of these models. In contrast, 
CLA uses the SOM, which has been shown as an excellent model of neural processing (see 
Kohonen 1997).
Finally, none of the models in this section use a hierarchical learning system. Ac-
cording to the Information Processing Principles, such a system is necessary for construc-
tivist learning. The reason that there are no hierarchical feedforward models of infant cog-
nition could be that it is not evident how one would make such a model using standard 
feedforward networks. CLA is a hierarchical learning system that can model the part-to-
whole process described by constructivist learning.
With these three main differences in mind, this section will discuss the different 
variants of the feedforward network in more detail below.
Backpropagation Networks
Feedforward networks first gained wide acceptance in infant cognition research with 
the publication of the watershed two-volume PDP compendium (Rumelhart, McClelland 
et al 1986; McClelland, Rumelhart et al 1986). A relevant article within this collection 
contained a backpropagation network model of infants  ̓acquisition of past tense endings 
(Rumelhart & McClelland 1986). The system was trained to produce the appropriate past 
tense ending for a presented word, and the systemʼs performance resembled infants  ̓per-
formance at this task: it performed fair, then it was terrible, then it was very good. (This is 
referred to as the U-Shaped Curve.)
As mentioned earlier, it is not always clear where the error signal for supervised 
learning would come from. However, for some domains — most famously, language — it 
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has been shown that any error signal that might be present in the environment would not 
be sufficient to learn in the domain (Chomsky 1968), otherwise known as the poverty of 
the stimulus. Thus, the Rumelhart & McClelland (1986) study was criticized for “giving 
away the answer” by providing normative feedback that didnʼt exist in an infantʼs environ-
ment. This is a common criticism for infant models that use feedforward networks and, 
consequently, unmodified backpropagation networks are seldom used anymore. When they 
are (as in Mareschal & Johnson 2002) they fall under the same criticism (Cohen & Chaput 
2002; Marcus 2002; Munakata & Stedron 2002; Smith 2002).
Supervised learning is not an issue for CLA. CLA uses the SOM, which is trained 
using an unsupervised learning system. Like the SOM, CLA does not use an error signal to 
build representations. CLA is a self-organizing learning system that builds knowledge by 
relating inputs to each other.
Simple Recurrent Networks
Elman (1990) proposed a more plausible approach to error-based learning for find-
ing structure in time-based or sequential information such as language. Elman proposed 
that the system should learn, given a stream of words, to predict the next word in the se-
quence. To allow the network to learn using context, Elman used a Simple Recurrent Net-
work (SRN) that combines the input of the current word with the activation of the hidden 
layer from the previous word. SRNs are still widely used in machine learning, and are also 
used to model infant cognition (Lewis & Elman 2001).
This approach to error-based learning is more plausible from an environmental per-
spective, since infants clearly do have access to the next item in some sequence (like the 
next word). However, these SRNs still rely on the controversial backpropagation learning 
algorithm, and do not use a hierarchical approach.
Auto-associator Networks
Another approach to error-driven learning is the auto-associator network (Labiouse 
& French 2001). This network works just like a backpropagation network, except that 
the network is trained to produce output that is identical to the input. Like other forms of 
dimensionality reduction, auto-associator networks learn a set of weights that capture the 
features of the stimuli. There is no poverty of the stimulus argument for auto-associator 
networks, since the error signal comes from the same source as the input itself. In fact, 
this approach to learning is similar to SOM and other self-organization learning systems. 
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Auto-associator networks have been used to model a number of domains in infant cog-
nitive development, including language and grammar learning (Sirois et al 2000; Sirois 
2004), categorization (Mareschal et al 2002), and visual object processing (Westermann & 
Mareschal 2004).
While auto-associator networks avoid error-driven learning, they are highly im-
plausible models of information processing in infants. Unlike the SOMʼs approach to self-
organization, which is affirmed by a body of neuroscientific research (Kohonen 1997), 
there is no such affirmation for auto-association. Biological plausibility aside, using a 
self-organizing system addresses the issue of learning without relying on environmental 
feedback. Still, auto-associator networks are seldom used to learn hierarchical knowledge 
structures.
Cascade-correlation
A variation of the auto-associator network uses cascade-correlation (Fahlman 
& Lebiere 1990) as a learning system. Cascade-correlation operates as a standard 
backpropagation network during learning, using the input as the target output. Once the 
error between the input and output has been minimized, the system introduces a new node 
to the hidden layer, and the error is minimized once again. The idea is that the initial set of 
hidden nodes will develop weights that categorize a the most dominant features in the input 
set, but there will be “exceptions,” or input vectors that are not properly reproduced using 
the initial hidden node weights. When a new node is introduced to the hidden layer, this 
node learns to reproduce some of the input vectors not previously learned, leaving only a 
second set of exceptions. More nodes are added until all the exceptions are handled.
Cascade-correlation networks have been used to model a wide variety of infant 
cognitive development (Shultz & Bale 2001; Shultz & Rivest 2001; see Shultz 2003 for 
an overview). This learning system has also been suggested as appropriate for higher-level 
constructivist learning because it can grow dynamically (Shultz & Mareschal 1997).
Still, cascade-correlation does not use a hierarchical knowledge structure like CLA. 
While cascade-correlation adds new nodes to learn new regularities, the new nodes still 
learn representations that operate at the same level as the original hidden nodes. In other 
words, no matter how many hidden nodes are added. Cascade-correlation has not been 
shown to develop the higher-level representations of other hierarchical learning systems 
like CLA. CLA does not learn to simply handle exceptions; it learns a new set of knowl-
edge based on regularities in the knowledge of lower layers. CLA̓ s ability to build entirely 
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new knowledge allows it to represent a stimulus at multiple levels simultaneously, and 
giving it the high-level processing preference and ability to fall back as described in the 
Information Processing Principles.
4.5.2 Reinforcement Learning
Schlesinger & Barto (1999) used Reinforcement Learning to model the develop-
ment of causal perception. Reinforcement Learning uses a reinforcement signal to associ-
ate states with actions that will result in the highest reward. In this case, the simulated agent 
received reinforcement when it would move its simulated eye to follow a moving billiard 
ball. The ball would move behind an occluding screen and reappear on the other side. The 
system eventually learned to anticipate the ball by moving the eye to look at the far edge of 
the screen before the ball emerged.
While Schlesinger and Barto demonstrate that reinforcement learning can learn this 
behavior, it is not very convincing as a model of cognitive development. Most obviously, 
there is no explanation for why a child would receive a reward for looking at a billiard ball. 
But a deeper problem is that the system doesnʼt actually demonstrate development of any 
kind, only the end result. CLA replicates the infant causality studies not only at their end-
points, but during learning as well.
4.5.3 Self-Organizing Models
CLA uses the SOM as a foundation work, and the SOM has modeled a great num-
ber of cognitive activities, including vision, audition, speech, and kinetics (Kohonen 1997). 
Kohonen (1988) even suggests methods for using the SOM for habituation and familiar-
ization. However, the original SOM is rarely used as a model of infant cognitive develop-
ment.
However, recent work in cognitive development models has been done with learn-
ing systems called Hebbian systems. Munakata and McClelland (2003) model grammar 
learning with these systems. Munakata (2003) also shows that these systems resemble neu-
ral systems in the brain. The kind of Hebbian networks studied by Munakata & McClelland 
are unsupervised self-organizing learning systems, and Munakata & Pfaffly (2004) include 
the SOM as a learning system that accurately captures their approach to Hebbian learning. 
Like the SOM, these systems do not learn hierarchical data structures, while CLA builds a 
hierarchical knowledge base.
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Bednar and Miikkulainen (2000a & 2000b) used a variant of the SOM called HLIS-
SOM (Bednar & Miikkulainen 2001) to model innate face visual preferences in infants. 
HLISSOMʼs hierarchically arranged self-organizing maps is similar to CLA. However, 
the goal of Bednar and Miikkulainen is a rigorous neural model based on neuroscientific 
research of the visual pathways in the brain. Thus, each layer and its role is predetermined 
before learning begins. CLA does not predetermine the role of each layer, but allows each 
layer to learn whatever regularities exist in the layers below.
Farkaš & Li (2001) use a SOM to organize the hidden unit activations of a SRN to 
learn the meanings of words. The model successfully grouped grammatical and semantic 
categories based on their placement in training sentences. This system is a clever combina-
tion of different learning systems for their different strengths. Like CLA, it is self-organiz-
ing and hierarchical. However, this system also has predetermined the roles of the different 
layers ahead of time. Additionally, while CLA is a homogeneous system of SOMs, Farkaš 
& Li use SOMs and SRNs, so it is not readily apparent how to build this system to include 
more levels.
Finally, one fascinating application uses self-organizing learning systems to model 
mother-child interaction in order to mechanically generate infant speech (Yoshikawa et al 
2003). The simulated infant has a SOM that organizes perceived auditory information from 
its mother and itself. These categories form the basis of a vowel sound production process 
that attempts to mimic the sounds that come from the mother. Like Farkaš & Liʼs system 
above, this system builds knowledge at multiple levels, but again these levels are predeter-
mined and the system is not designed for an arbitrary number of levels.
4.5.4 Evolutionary Systems
Evolutionary systems have also been proposed as a mechanism for modeling infant 
cognitive development (Schlesinger & Parisi 2001; Schlesinger 2004). Evolutionary sys-
tems use a genome to describe an agentʼs behavior. During training, multiple genomes are 
created and tested for fitness, usually by how well they perform a given task. The strongest 
genomes are then evolved through mutation and cross-breeding. Over time, a genome is 
developed that performs well at the task.
Putting aside the improbability of infants using evolution to learn during their first 
years, these studies never actually apply evolution to cognitive development. Perhaps when 




CLA was shown in this chapter to model infant cognitive development. Specifi-
cally, CLA reproduced contemporary studies of causal acquisition in infants. CLA not only 
learns to view events as causal, but learns in the same way that infants learn. Additionally, 
CLA also replicates infants  ̓ability to fall back to lower levels of representation when the 
stimulus is complicated or noisy.
CLA captures all of the elements of constructivist learning as delineated by the In-
formation Processing Principles (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002), allowing CLA to oper-
ate as a robust controller for mobile robots. The schemas learned in this experiment, though 
have been propositional schemas that classify observations. To control a robot CLA must 
build sensorimotor schemas that relate observations with actions (section 2.1.1). CLA̓ s 
ability to build sensorimotor schemas is shown in the next chapter.
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5. CLA for Mobile Robots
In the previous chapter, CLA reproduced infants  ̓acquisition of causal perception, 
demonstrating that CLA is a model of cognitive development. The acquisition of causal 
perception mirrored the constructivist learning process used by infants, and supported fall-
back when exposed to confusing stimuli. However, modeling cognitive development and 
robot control are two different things. In the experiments in the previous chapter, CLA built 
propositional schemas (section 2.1.1) that classified and related sensory input. For CLA to 
control a robot, CLA must also be able to learn sensorimotor schemas that relate sensory 
information with actions. In this chapter, we apply CLA to a simple agent model to dem-
onstrate that CLA is not limited to cognitive models or propositional schemas but can also 
build sensorimotor schemas and thus be applied to autonomous agents. CLA̓ s ability to 
learn sensorimotor schemas will lead, in the next chapter, to a demonstration of a real robot 
using CLA to learn a goal-directed policy from delayed reward.
To demonstrate that CLA can learn sensorimotor schemas, CLA is used to imple-
ment the Schema Mechanism (Drescher 1991), a landmark model of robot learning which 
builds sensorimotor schemas using a constructivist approach, but which has some short-
comings that prevent its application to real-world robots. CLA not only replicates all of the 
functionality of the Schema Mechanism, but does so more efficiently.
The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the Schema Mechanism and 
reviews its application to the Microworld, a very simple agent and environment. The next 
section compares the Schema Mechanism to CLA, discusses some of the efficiency prob-
lems of the Schema Mechanism, and describes how CLA addresses those problems. The 
third section describes the details of how CLA is used to reimplement the Schema Mecha-
nism. In the fourth section, CLA is applied to the Microworld, showing that CLA captures 
all the essential features and reproduces all of the functionality of the Schema Mechanism. 
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This application demonstrates that CLA̓ s abilities are a superset of those of the Schema 
Mechanism. It also demonstrates that CLA is not only an accurate model of infant cogni-
tion, but can build sensorimotor schemas and thus is applicable to robot control. This work 
not only allows CLA to be used with mobile robots, but will for the first time allow the 
Schema Mechanism to be applied to a realistic robot and environment.
5.1 The Schema Mechanism
Drescherʼs Schema Mechanism is a constructivist learning system for situated 
agents that, like CLA, is based on Piagetʼs (1936, 1937) theory of infant cognitive develop-
ment. Starting with atomic sensory and motor primitives, the Schema Mechanism builds 
three different classes of constructs: schemas, synthetic items, and composite actions. 
These constructs are then used to create further constructs and thus, like CLA, the Schema 
Mechanism builds a hierarchical knowledge representation. Drescher used the Schema 
Mechanism to simulate an infant exploring its environment using vision, touch and taste. 
The Schema Mechanism has stood as one of the best implementations of constructivist 
learning, and the only known learning system to model constructivism as described by 
Piaget. This section describes how the Schema Mechanism works so that, in the next sec-
tion, we can examine its weaknesses and see how CLA addresses those weaknesses.
5.1.1 Implementation Details
Prior to training, the Schema Mechanism starts with a set of primitive sensory items 
that reflect the state of the environment, such as InFrontOfDoor or DoorOpen. Each item is 
binary: it can be on or off. There is also a set of primitive actions whereby the agent can 
manipulate its environment, for example OpenDoor. As the system explores the environment 
by randomly selecting actions and monitoring the item states, the system can start to learn 
the association between item states and actions performed. These associations are repre-
sented as schemas. A schema is a prediction that given an initial set of item states (context), 
if a particular action is taken, then a certain change in item states can be expected (result). 
Drescherʼs schema is what Piaget would classify as a sensorimotor schema (section 2.1.1). 
A schema is written as context/action/result, where context is a set of items that are either 
on or off (indicated by a prefix of + or -, respectively), action is the name of the action, and 
result is a set of items indicating the change in the context state that occurs (again, prefixed 
with + or -). As an example:
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 +InFrontOfDoor/OpenDoor/+DoorOpen (5.1)
Schema 5.1 says that when I am in front of a door, and I try to open the door, the 
door will become open. A schema is successful when the activation of its action, while the 
context holds, effects the item transitions in its result. Statistics are maintained for each 
schema, including the schemaʼs reliability, which is the rate of successful activation. A 
schema is deemed reliable when its reliability is above a predefined threshold.
Schemas are created using a technique called marginal attribution. When the sys-
tem first starts, a schema is created for each action called a bare schema. Bare schemas 
have an empty context and an empty result, along with an extended context and extended 
result. The extended result maintains two data for every item: 1) a positive-transition cor-
relation, which is the ratio of an item being turned On when the schemaʼs action is per-
formed, and 2) a negative-transition correlation, which is the same statistic for items turn-
ing off. The extended context also maintains two statistics for every item: 1) the probability 
that the schema will succeed if that item is on, and 2) the same probability if the item is 
off. When an the positive-transition or negative-transition correlation of an extended result 
item crosses a predefined threshold, a new schema is “spun off” of the bare schema with 
that item in the result. Similarly, when a context item is found to make the schema signifi-
cantly more reliable, another schema is spun off, with those items added to the context of 
the spin-off schema.
Schemas can be used to create new synthetic items, which are newly created items 
representing hypothetical states that make a schema more reliable. For example, schema 
5.1 may not always work as described. If, say, the door is sometimes locked, then schema 
5.1 will sometimes fail. This fact may be difficult to learn, particularly if the doorʼs locked 
state cannot be directly sensed. When a schema is unreliable, it becomes “reified” as a 
synthetic item, which represents the state of the environment in which the schema is suc-
cessful. Thus, schema 5.1 can be reified by a synthetic item:
 [+InFrontOfDoor/OpenDoor/+DoorOpen] (5.2)
We could call synthetic item 5.2 “DoorOpenable.” It is on when the world is in a 
state where the schema will succeed. When a new synthetic item like this is created, it is 
tracked for correlations with all actions, just like primitive items, as part of marginal at-
tribution. Thus, synthetic items can be incorporated into new schemas. The relationship 
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between items and schemas, where each is used to build the other, is how Drescher imple-
ments constructivism: features, in the form of items, are combined using schemas and form 
new higher-level synthetic items.
Finally, schemas also support the creation of composite actions. When a new sche-
ma is created, and its result is unique among all other schemas, a new composite action is 
created, with the unique result as the “goal.” The schemas are then chained backwards from 
the goal by 1) finding all schemas whose result matches the goal, 2) finding the next set of 
schemas whose results match the contexts of the first set of schemas, and so on. A com-
posite action then has a set of contexts from which the goal can be reached, and the actions 
needed to get from a given context to the goal. For example, we could create a composite 
action with the goal DoorOpen:
 <+DoorOpen> (5.3)
When composite action 5.3 is selected, it selects a schema that, given the current 
state of all the items, would result in a item state change that would bring the agent one 
step closer to a state where the DoorOpen item is on. The action of that schema is then per-
formed. If the goal is not achieved by the first step, then the composite action would again 
select an appropriate schema, bringing the agent another step towards the goal. If it is ever 
the case that there is no appropriate schema, or composite action takes too many steps and 
times out, then the action will fail. Baring these cases, eventually the door will be open.
To summarize, the Schema Mechanism starts with a set of primitive items and 
primitive actions. It then explores the environment to create a set of sensorimotor schemas. 
These schemas form the basis of new synthetic items. They also are used in the creation of 
goal-directed composite actions. Using these techniques, an agent can build a hierarchy of 
items to describe its environment, and a hierarchy of sensorimotor schemas that are com-
bined into a plan for achieving some goal.
5.2 CLA and the Schema Mechanism
The Schema Mechanism is actually quite similar to CLA in spirit, if not in imple-
mentation. In this section, the two are compared as constructivist learning systems, the 
weaknesses of the schema mechanism are listed, and there is a discussion of how CLA 
addresses those weaknesses.
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5.2.1 Similarities between CLA and the Schema Mechanism
Due to their common ancestry, CLA and the Schema Mechanism are analogous. In 
CLA, each layer consists of prototypes that represent a correlation of lower-level features 
in the environment. CLA̓ s prototypes are analogous to Drescherʼs schemas that also use 
observed correlations to build a representation. The Schema Mechanism uses marginal at-
tribution to build a complete schema one spin-off at a time. CLA uses the SOM to represent 
the features in the environment, where all presented features compete for representation in 
the SOM layer. Like the correlated knowledge represented in a schemaʼs context, action 
and result, CLA represents correlated knowledge as the input weights for each node in a 
layer.
Just as the Schema Mechanism uses schemas as the basis for new hypothetical 
features (synthetic items) in the environment, each node in CLA becomes a feature that is 
presented to a higher-level layer via the activation vector. The Schema Mechanism creates 
new features from the knowledge of correlations found in the schemas. CLA̓  prototypes, 
which also hold correlative information, produce an activation vector that serves as an in-
put feature to the next layer of SOMs. Like the feature generation of synthetic items, CLA 
takes correlation information and uses it to create new features that can be used in further 
learning.
CLA and the Schema Mechanism both learn correlations of features and use them 
to create new features. Integrating lower-level knowledge to form higher-level knowledge 
is the essence of constructivist learning, and captures the Information Processing Prin-
ciples (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002) described in Chapter 2. The methods used to per-
form these operations are different, however. Specifically, the method used by the Schema 
Mechanism is too inefficient to apply it to a realistic robot and environment The efficiency 
of the Schema Mechanism is discussed in the next section.
5.2.2 Efficiency of the Schema Mechanism
Where CLA and the Schema Mechanism differ is in the way they allow the knowl-
edge base to grow. CLA clusters its knowledge in finite layers, representing different levels 
of representation, and learning takes place only one level at a time. The Schema Mecha-
nism is not structured in this way; new schemas can be constructed at any level at any time, 
and there is no limit to the number of schemas per level, or the number of levels generated. 
As a consequence, the Schema Mechanism has four serious efficiency issues relating to the 
marginal attribution technique that restrict it to only simple models. These efficiency issues 
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are not integral to constructivism in general, but apply only to the particular implementa-
tion used by the Schema Mechanism.
First, when a new schema is spun off from a source schema, all items must now be 
correlated with both the new schema and the source schema. Items can only be added to a 
schemaʼs context or result one at a time. The new schema that results from adding an item 
then co-exists with its parent schema, meaning that a schema with n context items and re-
sult items will leave a trail, in the best case scenario, of n+m intermediate schemas. Even-
tually, all combinations of contexts and results will be created, meaning that the growth is 
exponential. These intermediate schemas usually represent incomplete “stepping stone” 
correlations that do not occur in the environment, and their functionality usually subsumes 
that of their ancestors. Despite the vestigial nature of some intermediate schemas, they still 
figure into the statistical bookkeeping of marginal attribution. Intermediate schemas cannot 
simply be deleted, though, because they may represent a legitimate subset of correlations 
that do occur in the environment. The result is that the exponential growth of schemas 
makes the Schema Mechanism very resource intensive.
Compounding this problem, new synthetic items are added to the list of existing 
items which are being correlated with actions. The addition of new items to all schemas 
means that the introduction of a new item increases the number of correlations that must 
be computed by twice the number of schemas, one for contextual correlations and one for 
resulting correlations.
Moreover, each new composite action created produces yet another bare schema 
from which new schemas can be produced. All items are correlated with the performance 
of a composite action, and provide a new source for the exponential growth of schemas.
Finally, there is no process in the Schema Mechanism to prune items, schemas or 
actions. It may be possible to mark these constructs as inert and cease computations on 
them, or free them from memory altogether, but the method for pruning is not obvious, and 
Drescher does not propose one.
Because of marginal attribution, the Schema Mechanism will continually grow un-
til its resources have been exhausted. Consequentially, the Schema Mechanism has been 
limited to simple domains like Drescherʼs “Microworld,” a seven-by-seven grid that holds 
two objects that the agent can touch, see and taste. In order for the Schema Mechanism to 
be usable in realistic environments, a more efficient implementation is necessary. This ef-
ficiency is provided by CLA. CLA can not only implement the Schema Mechanism, but it 
improves upon it. The details of this implementation are described next.
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5.2.3 Efficiency of CLA
CLA̓ s use of SOMs makes generating knowledge more efficient. Rather than main-
taining an ever-growing table of correlation data, the SOM provides a finite data space and 
a process for different representations to compete for that space. So the number of potential 
synthetic items can be constrained from the beginning.
CLA also has a staged learning system, where one level settles and allows the next 
level to learn. Once a level of SOMs has been trained, they can be harvested for candidate 
higher-level representations – schemas in this case. The lower-level SOMs can then be 
frozen and their resources can be used for the next level of SOMs. 
Finally, CLA gives the modeler an alternative to the Schema Mechanismʼs every-
thing-correlates-with-everything approach to schema building. CLA allows for specific 
groups of inputs, or “modes,” to be sent to individual layers, further constraining growth 
of the knowledge base. For example, the inputs of the causal acquisition experiment in the 
previous chapter were separated into spatial and temporal modes.
Using CLA as the constructivist learning system makes the Schema Mechanism 
more efficient. Consequently, it becomes possible to apply it to more sophisticated do-
mains. First, though, it must be shown that CLA can implement the Schema Mechanism 
and produce the same functionality reported by Drescher. The next section presents an im-
plementation of the Schema Mechanism using CLA and compares it to the original Schema 
Mechanism using Drescherʼs agent and environment, the Microworld.
5.3 Implementing the Schema Mechanism with CLA
The Constructivist Learning Architecture Schema Mechanism, or CLASM, is an 
instance of CLA that implements the Schema Mechanism. CLASM uses the hierarchical 
SOMs of CLA to implement the Schema Mechanismʼs marginal attribution process. The 
resulting implementation replicates all the functionality of the Schema Mechanism, dem-
onstrating that CLA is not only an accurate cognitive model, but relevant to robot control. 
It also reimplements the Schema Mechanism more efficiently, allowing CLASM to be ap-
plied to realistic agents and environments, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter. This 
section includes the details of implementing the Schema Mechanism with CLA.
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5.3.1 Implementation Details of CLASM
Like the Schema Mechanism, CLASM starts with a set of primitive items and 
primitive actions. While the Schema Mechanism starts with a bare schema for each action, 
CLASM associates each action with an Action SOM. The Action SOM acts as a mode for 
all contexts and results that hold before and after the performance of an action.
The weight vector for each Action SOM has twice the number of items that exists 
at the time of the SOMʼs creation. The fi rst half of the weight vector represents the context, 
or the state of each item before the action is performed, represented by 1.0 (for on) or 0.0 
(for off). The second half represents the result, or the change in item status that took place 
during the actionʼs execution, which can range from –1.0 (an item has turned off) to +1.0 
(an item has turned on). An Action SOM is only trained if the action associated with the 
SOM was just completed. Initially, an Action SOM is created for each primitive action. The 
initial input is the context and result of all primitive items (Figure 5.1).
Once the Action SOMs have been trained, they are harvested for schemas. When 
a node becomes a schema, the weight vectors are converted into lists of context and result 
items. Context items with weights less than 0.1 become negative context items, and those 
with weights greater than 0.9 become positive context items. Context items that are neither 
consistently on or off will receive weights between 0.1 and 0.9; these items are not used in 
the resulting schema. Result items with a weight change of greater than 0.9 become result 











Primitive Items Initial Action SOMs
Potential Schema
Figure 5.1: The initial state of CLASM. Clasm starts with an initial set of Action SOMs, one for each 
action, which are trained only when the corresponding action is performed. The input to each Action SOM 
is all the item states prior to the action (context) and the change in the item states after the action has com-
pleted (results). Each node in the Action SOM is a potential schema, each with a prototype context and 
result.
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tive (on to off). Result items that do not turn on or turn off consistently, and thus receive a 
weight value between 0.1 and 0.9, are not used in the resulting schema. A node becomes a 
schema only if there is at least one result item (Figure 5.2). If such a schema already exists, 
then the SOM node is represented by the existing schema. If the schema does not exist, it 
is created. Once harvested, Action SOMs are frozen.
If a schema has a novel result, a new composite action is created with that result 
as the goal. All reliable schemas are chained backwards from the schema with the novel 
result.
Once the schemas are harvested, a new stage of training begins. At the beginning of 
the following stage, new Action SOMs are created in association with every action, includ-
ing the new composite actions. The input vector to the new Action SOMs is the context and 
result of every item, including the new synthetic items (Figure 5.3). A synthetic item is acti-
vated if its schema holds, i.e. if a) the schemaʼs action is performed, b) all positive context 
items are true and all negative context items are false when the action is initiated, and c) all 
positive result items are on and all negative result items off when the action terminates.
In summary, CLASM is a implementation of the Schema Mechanism using CLA. 
CLASM replaces marginal attribution with CLA̓ s layers of SOMs. This keeps the essential 






Primitive Items Initial schemas
Schema
[+item3/actionN/+item2]
Figure 5.2: Action maps are harvested for schemas. After training, the Action Maps are harvested for 
schemas. Nodes that have at least one result item become candidate schemas. Items in the prototype context 
and result become context and result items in the schema if they pass a threshold. Duplicates are ignored. 
In the fi gure, the node that represents +item3/actionN/+item2 has become a schema.
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5.4 Experiment: CLASM in the Microworld
To demonstrate that CLA can build sensorimotor schemas from experience, CLASM 
is trained on the Microworld, a simple agent and environment used by Drescher (1991) to 
test the Schema Mechanism. Like Drescherʼs experiment with the Schema Mechanism, the 
purpose of this experiment is not have the agent learn some specific ability, but to learn a 
full and rich representation of the environment from fundamental features and actions. In 
this section, the Microworld is described, along with the details of the learning parameters 
used by CLASM. Finally the knowledge built by CLASM is reported and compared with 
the results from Drescher (1991).
5.4.1 Experiment Setup
Drescher (1991) implemented a simple agent and environment called the Microworld 
(Figure 5.4), which was used to test his Schema Mechanism. To ensure that the CLASM is 
producing the same results as the original Schema Mechanism, it will be tested in the same 
environment. The Microworld, first described by Drescher (1991) is described here again.
The Microworld is a two-dimensional, seven-by-seven grid, with cell 0,0 at the 
bottom left. All objects in the Microworld are one grid cell in size. There are three objects 
in the Microworld: a ball, an agent, and the agentʼs hand. The ball is stationary, but can be 












Primitive Items Synthetic Items
Figure 5.3: Training the second level in CLASM. Once the schemas have been harvested from the first 
level, the schemas are reified as synthetic items. A new set of Action SOMs is created, one for each action 
including synthetic actions. The input for these Action SOMs is the context and result of all items, includ-
ing the newly created synthetic items.
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The agent is immobile, but has a hand, along with visual, tactile, taste and 
proprioceptive sensory systems. The vision system provides the agent with visual infor-
mation about the grid within the vicinity of the agent. First, the vision system reports the 
presence of objects within a fi ve-by-fi ve visual fi eld. Second, this visual fi eld has a “fovea” 
which reports “details” — features not seen outside the fovea — of objects at the center of 
the visual fi eld and the four adjacent fi eld grid cells: left, right, forward and back. Drescher 
used 16 arbitrary details, but there are only three objects in the world, so only 3 details are 
used in this experiment, one for each object. The center of vision can be moved around the 
Microworld only one cell at a time and only in the four cardinal directions. The agent can 
sense where the visual fi eld is centered via proprioception.
The hand can also be moved one cell at a time in the four cardinal directions. The 
hand is limited to a three-by-three area directly in front of the agent. (The hand cannot be 
beside or behind the agent.) The agent can sense the position of the hand via proprioceptive 
feedback, and can also see the hand if it happens to be looking in its direction. The hand can 
also report tactile information of objects that are directly adjacent to the hand. The hand can 
be opened and closed, and the agent can sense whether the hand is opened or closed. When 
the hand occupies the same grid cell as the object and is closed, the object is grasped by 
the hand such that, when the hand moves, the object moves with it. The hand can then be 
opened, depositing the object. The hand can report on tactile “details,” similar to visual de-












Figure 5.4: The Microworld. The Microworld is the simple agent and 7-by-7 environment used by 
Drescher (1991) and by the experiment in this chapter. Cell 0,0 is at the bottom left. The environment con-
tains the agent, a gripper, and a ball. The visual fi eld, in light gray, covers a 5-by-5 area and reports course 
visual information. At the center of the visual fi eld is the fovea, in dark gray, which reports visual “details.” 
The fovea has fi ve sections: front (F), back (B), left (L), right (R) and center (X).
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cell as the hand (regardless of whether the object is held or released). There are four tactile 
details, 0 through 3, and the ball has details 1 and 3. (Tactile details 0 and 2 are unused.)
Finally, the agent itself can feel objects that are directly adjacent to the body of the 
agent. Objects that are directly in front of the agent and grasped can also be tasted.
The agent is given a set of primitive actions, described in Table 5.1, which allow 
it to move its eye, its hand, and to open and close its hand. The agent senses the world 
through a set of primitive items, listed in Table 5.2. These items allow the agent to sense 
the environment via vision, touch, taste and proprioception.
At the start of each simulation, the agent is positioned at cell 3,1. The hand and the 
ball were started in random positions within the handʼs reach. The hand and the ball were 
never started at the same place.
5.4.2 Learning Parameters
CLASM alternated between sensing the world and selecting an action. Actions 
were selected at random. Each action map was 10-by-10 nodes in size. The learning pa-
rameters of each map followed the standard SOM training procedure of gradually reducing 
the learning rate and neighborhood until there was little or no change in the layer, which 
usually took about 10,000 iterations. All layers at each level had identical learning param-
eters.
Once the first level had been trained, the training on layers in the first level was 
stopped, and the new action maps were created. These maps followed the same training 
regimen. Two levels were trained.
Primitive Action Function
handf, handb, handr, handl These actions move the hand forward, backward, right and left, re-spectively.
eyef, eyeb, eyer, eyel These actions move the eye forward, backward, right and left, re-spectively.
grasp
This action closes the hand. If the hand is in the same cell as an ob-
ject, and the hand wasnʼt already closed, then the hand will grasp the 
object. A grasped object moves with the hand.
ungrasp This action opens the hand, releasing any object it might hold.
Table 5.1: Primitive actions in the Microworld. This table lists the ten primitive actions available to the 
agent in the Microworld. These actions allow the agent to control its hand and gaze.
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5.4.3 Results
The training session resulted in a hierarchy of knowledge that reproduced all 
of the functionality reported by Drescher. This demonstrates that CLASM is indeed a 
reimplementation of the Schema Mechanism. CLASM also produced many knowledge 
structures that were not reported by Drescher, but this does not necessarily mean that they 
were not generated by the Schema Mechanism: they may have been generated and not 
reported. However, the output that Drescher chose to highlight represents what he consid-
ered the essential features of the Schema Mechanism. CLASM has these same essential 
features, which are described in detail below.
Following is a summary of the knowledge generated by CLASM, along with an 
interpretation of their meaning. Refer to tables 5.1 and 5.2 for the meaning of individual 
items and actions. Also included is the page number in Drescher (1991), where these results 
Item Meaning
hp11,..., hp33
Haptic-proprioceptive (hand-position) items, one for each pos-
sible hand position. Position (1,1) is the lower left corner of the 
range.
vp11,..., vp33
Visio-proprioceptive (eye-position) items, one for each possible 
glance orientation. Coordinate designates center of visual field, 
using the same conventions as for hand position.
tactf, tactb, tactr, tactl Coarse tactile items, one for each side of the hand (front, back, right and left).
text0, text1, text2, text3 Detailed tactile items, denoting arbitrary textural details on an object in the same cell as the hand.
bodyf, bodyb, bodyr, bodyl Coarse tactile items, one for each side of the body (front, back, right and left).
taste0, taste1, taste2, taste3 Taste items, designating arbitrary surface details of an object touching the mouth (front edge of the body).
hcl Hand closed.
hgr Hand closed and grasping something.
vf00,..., vf44 Coarse visual-field items, one for each of 25 cells. Region 0,0 is at the lower left.
fovf0, fovf1, fovf2 
fovb0, fovb1, fovb2 
fovr0, fovr1, fovr2 
fovl0, fovl1, fovl2 
fovx0, fovx1, fovx2
Visual details corresponding to each of five foveal regions: front, 
back, right, left and center. Each has three details.
Table 5.2 Primitive items in the Microworld. This table lists the set of primitive items that are available 
to the agent in the Gridworld. These items allow the agent to see, touch, taste, and know the location of its 
own hand and eye relative to the agent (proprioception).
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were originally reported. While many of the schemas generated by CLASM are identical 
to those reported by Drescher, some of the schemas reported below are variants but which 
still demonstrate the fundamental capability that Drescher illustrates with his results. All of 
the capabilities reported by Drescher are also produced by CLASM.
Grasping (p120)
These schemas are examples of the simplest schemas:
 /grasp/+hcl, (5.4) 
 +text0+text2/grasp/+hcl+hgr. (5.5)
Schema 5.4 says that when the agent closes its hand (grasp), the agentʼs hand is 
closed (+hcl). There are no context items for schema 5.4 because this schema always works. 
Schema 5.5 says that when the agent can feel something (+text0+text2, the tactile details of 
the ball), and it closes its hand (grasp), the agentʼs hand is closed and grasping something. 
In this case, grasping something (+hgr) is dependent on feeling something (+text0+text2).
Elaborating the visual field (p122)
These schemas report the change in relative position of seen objects when the eye 
moves:
 +vf21/eyer/+vf11-vf21 (5.6) 
 +vf30/eyer/+vf20-vf30 (5.7)
Schema 5.6 says that, given an object at 2,1 (+vf21), if the agentʼs eye moves to 
the right, then the agent will see an object at 1,1 (+vf11) and it will no longer see an object 
at 2,1 (-vf21). Schema 5.7 works in a similar way. CLASM is learning the relationship 
between what is seen and moving the eye. These relationships can be grouped together to 
fully describe the position of an object throughout all four eye movements:
 +vf34/eyer/-vf34+vf44, (5.8) 
 +vf44/eyel/-vf44+vf34, (5.9) 
 +vf44/eyef/+vf43-vf44, (5.10) 
 +vf43/eyeb/+vf44-vf43. (5.11)
By mapping out the visual field in this way, CLASM can build a plan for moving 
the eye that will put the object in an arbitrary position in the visual field.
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Foveal relations (p124)
CLASM also learns the same sort of visual relationship between the areas in the 
fovea:
 +vp23+vf22+fovb0/eyeb/+vp22-vp23-fovb0+fovx0. (5.12)
Schema 5.12 says, given that the agent sees something directly behind the center of 
vision (+fovb0), and the eye is moved back (eyeb), then the agent will be looking directly 
at the object (fovx0). All foveal relations of this nature are generated.
Elaborating the proprioceptive fields (p126)
CLASM also learns the relationships between moving they eye and sensing where 
the eye is looking. The following is a network of visual schemas similar to 5.8 through 
5.11, except that rather than sensing an object, the eye is sensing itself:
 +vp23/eyer/-vp23+vp33, (5.13) 
 +vp33/eyel/-vp33+vp23, (5.14) 
 +vp33/eyeb/-vp33+vp32, (5.15) 
 +vp32/eyef/+vp33-vp32. (5.16)
Schema 5.13 says that, given that the agentʼs eye is at 2,3 (+vp23), if the eye is 
moved to the right (eyer), then the agentʼs eye is at 3,3 (+vp33) and no longer at 2,3 (-
vp23). Schemas 5.13 through 5,16 and others like them would allow CLASM to point the 
eye at any coordinates given an arbitrary starting location.
A similar set of schemas is produced for hand movements and hand 
proprioception:
 +hp23/handr/-hp23+hp33, (5.17) 
 +hp33/handl/+hp23-hp33, (5.18) 
 +hp22/handf/-hp22+hp23, (5.19) 
 +hp33/handb/-hp33+hp32. (5.20)
Schema 5.17 says that, given the agentʼs hand is at 2,3 (+hp23), if the agent moves 
its hand to the right (handr), its hand will be at 3,3 (+hp33) and no longer at 2,3 (-hp23). 




In this case, an action will turn an item off. We have already seen many examples 
above. Here are three more:
 +vp31+vf10/eyel/+vp21-vp31-vf10, (5.21) 
 +vp21/eyel/+vp11-vp21, (5.22) 
 +hp13+vf24/handb/+hp12-hp13. (5.23)
Schema 5.21 says that, if the agent is looking at position 3,1 (+vp31) and it sees 
something at 1,0 (+vf10), and the eye moves to the left (eyel), then the agent is now look-
ing at 2,1 (+vp21) and not at 3,1 anymore (-vp31), and there is no longer any object at 1,0 
(-vf10). The object just disappears because it has exited the visual field.
Schemas 5.22 and 5.23 are variants of the visio-proprioceptive and haptic-
proprioceptive schemas above, respectively.
Positional actions (p127-129)
Once the first stage is complete, the results of these schemas form the goals of new 
composite actions. CLASM produces the same actions reported by Drescher:
 New action: <+hp22>, (5.24) 
 New action: <+hp33>, (5.25) 
 New action: <+vp22>, (5.26) 
 New action: <+vp33>, (5.27) 
 New action: <+vf34>, (5.28) 
 New action: <+vf12>. (5.29)
Each of these composite actions is described by a goal state. In the case of 5.24, 
the goal this composite action is to have the hand be at position 2,2. Within this and every 
composite action is a network of schemas that can build a plan for getting from the current 
state to the goal state.
Moving the hand to the mouth (p129)






Schema 5.30 is the final step in moving an object to the mouth. The context of 
schema 5.30 say that the hand is at position 2,2 (+hp22), they eye is also at 2,2 (+vp22), the 
hand can feel the ball (+text1+text3), the hand is closed and grasping something (+hcl+hgr), 
there is something directly at the center of the visual field (+vf22), and specifically there 
is a hand and the ball at the center of the fovea (+fovx1+fovx2). Given this context, if the 
agent moves the hand back, then the hand will now be at 2,1 (+hp21-hp22), the ball will 
be against the front of the agentʼs body (+bodyf), it can taste the ball (+taste1+taste3), the 
object has moved in the visual field from 2,2 to 2,1 (+vf21-vf22), and the ball and hand 
have moved from the center of the fovea to the back of the fovea (+fovb1+fovb2-fovx1-
fovx2).
The importance of schema 5.30 is that now +taste1 can become the goal of a com-
posite object. This will allow CLASM to start from a large number of initial item states and 
build a plan to put the ball in the agentʼs mouth.
Visual effects of incremental hand motions (p130-131)
CLASM has learned how the visual field is altered when the hand moves:
 +vf11/handl/+vf01-vf11. (5.31)
Schema 5.31 says that, if the agentʼs hand is at 1,1 (+vf11) and it moves its hand to 
the left (handl), then the agent will see something at 0,1 (+vf01-vf11). Notice that the agent 
doesnʼt know what it is seeing, either before or after the hand moves. This is because cell 
0,1 of the visual field is outside the fovea, so the details of the object cannot be discerned. 
Regardless, CLASM has learned this regularity. If the hand moves within the foveal region, 
then the schema becomes more detailed:
 +hp22+vp32+vf11+fovl2/handr/ 
 -hp22+hp32-vf11+vf21-fovl2+fovx2. (5.32)
Schema 5.32 says that, given the agentʼs hand is at 2,2 (+hp22) and the eye is at 3,2 
(+vp32) and it sees something at 1,1 (+vf11) that turns out to be the hand on the left side 
of the fovea (+fovl2), then if I move the hand to the right (handr), now the hand is at 3,2 (-
hp22+hp32), the object has moved from 1,1 to 2,1 (-vf11+vf21) and that object is the hand 
moving from the left of the fovea to the center (-fovl2+fovx2).
61
Touching what is seen (p132)
CLASM also learns to touch what it sees with the help of a composite action. A 
schema using the composite action <+fovx1> can be used to move the hand to touch an 
item just below the center of vision:
 /<+fovx1>/+tactb+fovx1. (5.33)
Schema 5.33 says that, if the agent moves the hand to the center of its vision, it will 
feel something just below the hand. This schema only succeeds when there is something 
just below the center of vision. It may fail (say, if the agent tries to affect <+fovx1> by 
moving the eye and not the hand), but its success will reveal the position of the ball and 
how to touch it.
Similar schemas can move the eye to see what is touched.
Palpable and visible persistent objects (p136-137)
These are synthetic items that represent the beginning of a persistent-object concept 
for the agent.
 [/<+hp21>/+hp21+tactl]. (5.34)
In synthetic item 5.34, the composite action <+hp21> is used to create the hypo-
thetical feature “Palpable object at 1,1.” In other words, when 5.34 is true, then the sup-
porting schema is predicted to work. If that schema works, then that means the agent can 
be confident that, were it to move its hand to 2,1 (<+hp21>), its hand would end up at 2,1 
(+hp21) and it would feel something to its left (+tactl). Thus, turning on synthetic item 5.34 
means that there is an object at 1,1. Note that the agent does not necessarily have to move 
its hand to determine this fact about the world. Synthetic item 5.34 represents the a higher-
level feature in the world that would make the underlying schema true.
Similarly, the following synthetic item represents “Visible object at (3,3)”:
 [/<+vp22>/+vp22+vf33]. (5.35)




Finally, these schemas represent persistent-object information across modalities:
 +vp12+fovb1/<+hp21>/+hp21+tactl, (5.35) 
 +hp21+tactl/<+vp12>/+vp12+fovb1. (5.36)
Schema 5.35 says that, given the agentʼs eye is at 1,2 (+vp12), and the agent sees the 
ball at the back of the fovea (+fovb1), then if the agent moves its hand to 2,1 (<+hp21>), 
the hand will end up at 2,1 (+hp21) and it will feel something to the left of the hand (+tactl). 
Schema 5.35 connects the visual information in the context with the tactile information in 
the result by moving the hand. Conversely, schema 5.36 connects the tactile information in 
the context with the visual information in the result by moving they eye.
5.4.4 Experiment Discussion
CLASM succeeded in building a rich and full model of the agent and its envi-
ronment, reproducing all of the reported capabilities of the original Schema Mechanism. 
This result demonstrates both that CLA can learn sensorimotor schemas and that CLA is 
a reimplementation of the Schema Mechanism. CLA reproduced the capabilities of the 
Schema Mechanism while imposing hard restrictions on the growth of the knowledge base 
to well-defined layers of schemas. What makes CLA more efficient than the Schema Mech-
anism is how it bypasses simple schemas with one or two result items, and jumps directly 
to more complex, multi-result and multi-context schemas. There is no need to go through 
the stepwise building process to get to more complex schemas because the entire context 
and result are being presented to the SOM at once. The resulting complex schemas simply 
emerge from the data. Simpler schemas are easy to derive from the final product, should 
they be desired.
It is worth noting that the original Schema Mechanism pushed the limits of a Think-
ing Machines CM2 computer with 2 gigabytes of memory and 65,536 physical proces-
sors operating in parallel, while all the experiments in this dissertation were performed 
comfortably on a Apple PowerBook with a single G4 processor and 640 megabytes of 
memory. This is not enough information to draw a scientific conclusion, and the difference 
in architectural and programming styles does not support a direct comparison. However, 
itʼs reasonable to speculate that CLASM puts less demand on a given platform than the 
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Schema Mechanism, and that these differences stem in part from their different approaches 
to implementing constructivism.
5.5 Conclusion
CLA has been shown to build both propositional and sensorimotor schemas, mak-
ing it relevant to agent control. In addition to being an accurate model of infant cognitive 
development, CLA can build a grounded, rich and full model of a simple agent in a simple 
environment through experience. The implementation used to do build this model is a 
reimplementation of the Schema Mechanism. This reimplementation is both faithful to the 
original and more efficient. CLA̓ s ability to build a grounded model of the environment 
with sensorimotor schemas will allow it to be applied to a realistic robot in the next chap-
ter. CLA̓ s adherence to the Information Processing Principles (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 
2002) will also allow a robot to have the adaptability and fallback that are necessary com-
ponents of robust control. This is demonstrated in the next chapter.
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6. Learning with Delayed Rewards
In Chapter 4, CLA was used to model infants  ̓ acquisition of causal perception, 
demonstrating that CLA learned hierarchical knowledge, had stage-like development, and 
supported graceful degradation using fallback. In Chapter 5, CLA was used to control a 
simple agent, demonstrating that CLA can also learn sensorimotor schemas making it ap-
plicable to robot control. In this chapter, these two ideas come together: CLA is used to 
control a robot that learns how to forage by building a hierarchical representation of its 
environment, and responds to unexpected damage with graceful degradation.
So far, CLA has been used as an unsupervised, hierarchical learning system for 
propositional and sensorimotor schemas. In this chapter, CLA will learn goal-directed be-
havior with delayed rewards. CLA is a new kind of skill learning system for such domains. 
In addition to assigning value to schemas, like any Reinforcement Learning system, CLA 
generates new synthetic items that are used to make these schemas more reliable. This 
chapter presents two experiments that demonstrate this novel approach to learning with 
delayed rewards, and show that such a system provides a robot with robust control using 
fallback.
The first section discusses the challenges specific to learning with delayed rewards, 
and compares CLA̓ s approach to other standard Reinforcement Learning approaches. The 
next section describes an experiment where a Pioneer robot, simulated on an externally 
verified platform, is trained to forage for specimens. The knowledge that is learned, and 
how it applies to the goal of foraging, is discussed in detail. The third section describes an-
other experiment in which the trained robot is damaged, and the performance of the robot 
is compared to pre-damage levels. This is similar to the fallback experiment in Chapter 4, 
and demonstrates that CLA is a robust robot controller. Finally, CLA is compared to other 
related work.
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6.1 CLA and Delayed Rewards
The SOM, the central component of CLA, is an unsupervised, self-organizing 
learning system. CLA does not make use of normative feedback or an error signal to build 
knowledge. This is important for a large tract of cognitive modeling and machine learning, 
where environmental feedback is unobtainable or nonexistent. Up to this point in this dis-
sertation CLA has been used as a system that learns a hierarchical representation through 
observation without feedback.
However, if the robot is to perform some goal-directed behavior, unsupervised 
learning is not enough. Unsupervised learning is a value-free approach to machine learn-
ing, but goal-directed behavior implies that at least one thing — the goal — has a value. 
An unsupervised learning system, like the unmodified SOM, can give a robot choices, but 
it cannot help the robot decide which choice to take. In this section, a system is described 
for choosing between schemas, and this system is compared to standard Reinforcement 
Learning techniques.
6.1.1 Constructivist Reinforcement Learning
To support goal-based learning, CLA uses a technique for assigning value to items 
originally suggested by Drescher (1991), but never implemented or tested. CLA allows 
primitive items to be assigned an inherent value, indicating how desirable it is for that item 
to be true. Using the CLASM implementation described in the previous chapter, CLA dis-
covers schemas that have valuable items in their results. These schemas are then assigned 
the value of their result. Because we know, with some degree of reliability, that the context 
of a valuable schema can lead to the activation of valuable items, the context items can 
receive a deferred value. Thus, schemas can be chained backwards by matching the context 
of a valuable schema with the result of another schema. Any items which are connected to 
the valuable result are assigned a deferred value. In addition, the reliability of each schema 
is maintained. To select an action, the most valuable of the applicable schemas is chosen 
and, in the event of a tie, the most reliable of those is chosen.
This approach is similar to the ideas at work in Reinforcement Learning algorithms 
such as Q-Learning (Watkins & Dayan 1992; Sutton & Barto 1998). Q-Learning deter-
mines the value of state/action pairs through exploration. Values are propagated throughout 
the state space using a temporal differences algorithm.
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Unlike Q-Learning, however, CLA builds entirely new high-level features that rep-
resent the reliability of a schema. A schemaʼs context and action are essentially a state/ac-
tion pair that receives its value from the result. Higher-level features — or synthetic items 
as they are called by Drescher — are hypothetical states in the environment that indicate 
the reliability of their source schemas. Thus, if a synthetic item indicates the reliability of a 
valuable schema, then the synthetic item is also valuable. These new items can be included 
in the contexts of newer, higher-level schemas, and can receive their own deferred value.
Creating new features is something that standard Reinforcement Learning algo-
rithms simply do not address. High-level features are not chosen by the programmer but 
discovered by the learning algorithm. CLA elaborates on the original state space by discov-
ering hidden features that describe the applicability of its schemas. These new features can 
then be used in a new set of higher-level schemas, which become the source of still more 
higher-level features. Without an adequate set of states, even the simplest Reinforcement 
Learning problem can be unsolvable. Elaborating the state space can give Reinforcement 
Learning the features needed to learn an important policy. Additionally, by extending learn-
ing with delayed rewards to higher-level constructed representations, CLA can build more 
sophisticated control based on unseen states, and give the robot a strategy for handling 
noisy input.
This is not to say the CLA will learn a policy faster or more efficiently than Q-
Learning or some other Reinforcement Learning algorithm, and no comparison based 
on speed or efficiency is implied. Instead, CLA offers a capability that is orthogonal and 
complementary to Q-Learning. Indeed, the approach to learning from delayed rewards pre-
sented here could probably be replaced with a more sophisticated Reinforcement Learning 
algorithm to improve the system even further. But that is not a proposed thesis and thus 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. (However, it does suggest an avenue of future re-
search; see section 7.1.5.)
6.1.2 Robust Reinforcement Learning
Using CLA for learning with delayed rewards also brings the advantages of fall-
back and recovery. A Q-Learning system will develop a policy based on a single set of sen-
sors and actions. But if the underlying tenets of the policy are compromised by a change in 
the environment, then all of the policy may fail at once, without any behavior to fall back 
on other than random exploration.
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CLA, on the other hand, builds a policy in layers from most general to most specif-
ic. As shown in section 4.4, when the nature of the input changes, the more specific higher 
levels may fail, but the lower-level knowledge still remains somewhat applicable. Fallback 
gives a robot a policy for action — even if it is a less efficient one — when the most spe-
cialized knowledge becomes inapplicable. Not only does fallback provide a method for 
graceful degradation, but it also facilitates recovery. While algorithms like Q-Learning 
will need to resort to random exploration to rebuild its knowledge base, CLA can reassess 
the reliability of its schemas and start making better choices right away. This decreases the 
relearning time, and the time spent by the robot in suboptimal behavior.
6.1.3 Summary
CLA is a new approach to learning from delayed rewards. It brings hierarchical 
learning to standard Reinforcement Learning algorithms, allowing for policies to be built 
on hypothetical features in the environment. It also brings fallback to these learning sys-
tems, making the robot more resilient to changes in the stimuli, and expediting the recovery 
process.
6.2 Experiment: Foraging
To demonstrate learning with delayed reward, a Pioneer robot uses CLA to learn 
how to foraging for specimens. The robot is equipped with a camera and grippers, and it 
must locate, approach and collect specimens. Just as with the Microworld in the previous 
chapter, CLA is expected to learn a set of lower-level schemas, and use those schemas to 
build a set of higher-level schemas. In addition, CLA will learn which schemas will reliably 
result in a valuable outcome. This experiment will demonstrate CLA̓ s ability to learn with 
delayed rewards.
6.2.1 Robot and Environment
The robot in this experiment is a Pioneer 2-DX robot that is simulated by Stage 
(Vaughn 2000), an externally validated robot simulator (figure 6.1). The robot is equipped 
with a differential drive, active grippers, bump sensors, and a camera using the CMVision 
blob tracker (Bruce et al 2000) to detect blobs of color. The grippers are equipped with a 
laser to detect the presence of an object between the paddles of the gripper. The robot is 
placed in a circular room with 28 specimens, which are identifiable by their color. CLA 
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communicates with the Stage simulator using the Player robot device server (Gerkey et al 
2000; Gerkey et al 2003). The robotʼs camera has a 60° viewing angle which is divided into 
5 sectors of 12° each (Figure 6.2). The blob tracker can detect the presence of a specimen 
in each of these five sectors.
The robot has six primitive actions (Table 6.1) that allow the robot to move forward 
or backward by 50cm (forward and backward), turn left or right 5° (turnl and turnr), turn 
completely around (turnaround), and close its grippers (grip). The robot also has seven 
primitive items (Table 6.2) for observing its environment. Five of these items, s1 through 
s5, indicate that a specimen is within one of the cameras sectors, ranging from far left to 
far right. The other two items allow the robot to sense when the gripperʼs beam bas been 
broken (ingrip) and when the bump sensors are triggered (bump).
The robot has two built-in reactive behaviors. First, whenever the robot detects an 
object in its grippers (ingrip), it automatically closes the grippers and acquires the speci-
men (grip). Second, whenever the robot runs into a wall (bump), it backs up and turns 
around (back and turnaround).
         
Figure 6.1: The Pioneer 2-DX, real and simulated. The robot used in this experiment is a Pioneer 2-DX 
with a differential drive, a camera, and a pair of active grippers. The actual robot is picture on the left. The 
robot is simulated using Stage, an externally validated robot simulator. On the right is the display window 
from the Stage simulator. The robot is the rectangular box. The camera has a 60° viewing angle, as dia-
gramed by the diagonal lines coming from the robot. The Blob View, pictured above it and to the left, shows 
the available “blobs” in the CMVision blob tracker.
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6.2.2 Learning System
This experiment uses the CLA implementation of the Schema Mechanism (CLASM) 
described in the previous chapter, plus the value distribution mechanism described above 
(section 6.1). One item, ingrip, has an inherent value of 10.0. For any schema that results in 
some valuable item (such as ingrip) being ʻonʼ, the context items of that schema received a 
deferred value that is 95% of the resulting value. Values are propagated through all avail-
able schemas. An item that receives multiple values (by being in various places in the 
schema chain) retains the maximum of the values. Deferred values are generated whenever 
a new schema is created.
In addition, the method of building sensorimotor schemas was altered. CLASM 
used the Schema Mechanismʼs method of including an item in the result only if that item 
changed (either from on to off or vice versa) as a result of the schema. This worked fi ne in 
the Microworld, where all locations and positions are discrete and movement necessarily 
causes a change. But the environment used in this experiment is continuous, and the reso-
lution of the sensors low, so movement in this environment might not result in a change. 
Consequently, using the changed-item approach to schema building would keep many im-
portant schemas from being learned. For this experiment, CLA trained simply on the item 






Figure 6.2: The robotʼs visual system. The robot has a 60° viewing angle, shown in gray above. The im-
age is separated into fi ve sectors of 12° each. When a robot detects a blob in one of these sectors, then the 
corresponding item (s1 through s5) becomes true.
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6.2.3 Action Policy
An optimal action can be selected by choosing the most valuable applicable schema, 
that is, the schema with the most valuable result whose context matches with the current 
environment state. In the event of a tie, the schema with the highest reliability is chosen. If 
there is no applicable schema, an action is chosen at random.
During training, it is useful to find schemas that are known to work and explore 
them more fully by using them more often. However, if the system always chooses the 
most valuable schema, it wonʼt have an opportunity to discover potentially more direct and 
more valuable strategies. Adding a small amount of exploration, say 30% explore vs. 70% 
goal-directed, will allow CLA to eventually learn a full model of the environment. How-
ever, a greater amount of exploration speeds up the learning process. Thus, during training 
CLA uses the most valuable schema 20% of the time, and selects a random action the other 
80% of the time.
6.2.4 Training Parameters
Like CLASM in the previous chapter, the system is trained on context-result pairs 
for each action. Each action has its own SOM that are each 20x20 nodes in size. The system 
was trained until there was minimal change in the first level of representations, usually for 
10000 actions. After 10000 training epochs, schemas were harvested from the first level, 
synthetic items were created for each schema, and a second level of Action SOMs was 
created and trained. For each layer, the neighborhood was steadily decreased from 15 to 0, 
while the learning rate was simultaneously decreased from 0.3 to 0.01.
To test CLA̓ s performance, the knowledge base was stored every 1000 training 
epochs for 10 different training runs. This knowledge base was loaded into a robot that 
was placed in the training environment and run for 3000 actions. The number of captured 
Primitive Action Function
forward, backward Moves the robot forward or backward 10cm.
turnl, turnr Turns the robot 5° to the left or to the right.
turnaround Turns the robot 180°.
grip Closes the grippers and reopens them. If a specimen is within the grippers, it will be obtained.
Table 6.1: Primitive actions in the foraging experiment. This table lists the six primitive actions avail-
able to the agent in foraging experiment. These actions allow the agent to move around the space and 
acquire specimens.
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specimens was counted. This statistic was measured three times for each of the 10 knowl-
edge base snapshots. 
6.2.5 Experiment Results
CLA quickly built up a basic set of schemas required to target and acquire a speci-
men. Not surprisingly for such a simple task, CLA developed a policy for maximizing 
value after only a few thousand steps. CLA also built higher-level items that further refined 
the state space. These items were used to build higher-level schemas that were more effi-
cient and more reliable than the lower-level schemas. The details of the learned knowledge, 
and the reliability of the schemas, are described below.
CLA̓ s performance is graphed in Figure 6.3. CLA learned its best lower-level poli-
cy after about 3000 training epochs. Upper-level schemas started training after 10000 train-
ing epochs. The upper-level schemas significantly improved performance (M = 22.9, S.D. 
= 1.19) over lower-level schemas by themselves (M = 20.4, S.D. = 1.53), t(18) = -2.55, P 
= 0.02 (two-tailed).
6.2.6 Discussion
CLA developed a set of schemas that gave the robot useful abilities and enhanced 
its performance. This section discusses these results by first highlighting some of the ro-
botʼs learned abilities, including navigation, hidden features, feature refinement, and object 
persistence. The robotʼs performance is then discussed in relation to these abilities, and 
the contribution of lower-level schemas and upper-level schemas are compared. All of the 
lower level schemas described below were generated in every one of the 10 experiments. 
Item Meaning
s1, s2, s3, s4, s5
Triggered by the blob tracker, these items indicate that a speci-
men is visible in the camera. The different items specify where 
the specimen is in the field of view: on the far left (s1), on the 
near left (s2), in the center (s3), on the near right (s4) or on the 
far right (s5).
ingrip Triggered by the gripper laser beam being broken, this indicates than an object is within the grippers.
bump Triggered by the bump sensors surrounding the robots body, this indicates that the robot has struck a wall.
Table 6.2 Primitive items in the foraging experiment. This table lists the set of primitive items that are 
available to the agent in the foraging experiment. These items allow the agent to see specimens, sense when 
they are in the gripper, and sense when the robot has struck a wall.
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Some of the higher level schemas did not develop in some of the runs, but six runs gener-
ated all of the higher-level constructs reported below. Because the items s1 through s5 are 
mutually exclusive, some schemas in this section are abbreviated for readability by remov-
ing redundant negative context and result items.
Robot Navigation
As the robot explored the space, CLA quickly built up simple turning schemas that 
would move a specimen from one part of the visual field to the other. For example:
 +s1/turnl/+s2. (6.1)
Schema 6.1 states simply that when there is a specimen in Sector 1, and the robot turns left, 
then there will be a specimen in Sector 2. Schemas like these were learned for all sectors 
and both turn commands. These schemas were not very reliable (M = .286, S.D. = .012) for 
reasons that are discussed later.
The robot also learned that moving forward while the specimen is in front will 
leave the specimen in front:
 +s3/forward/+s3. (6.2)
Figure 6.3: Performance at different stages in learning. The graph shows the number of specimens 
acquired during 3000 actions using the schemas available at different points in training. Level 2 started 
training at 10000 epochs. CLA quickly learned an effective strategy for acquiring specimens using lower-
level schemas. Once Level 2 started training, CLA then learned a set of higher-level schemas that increased 
the robotʼs performance.
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Schema 6.2 is a strategy for approaching a specimen that is centered in the camera, and is 
the most used schema for acquiring a specimen, although it too is not very reliable (M = 
.351, S.D. = .012). Schemas like 6.1 and 6.2 were built very early during training. Howev-
er, actually acquiring a specimen is much more rare, and took longer to learn. Since ingrip 
is the only item with any value, and no schema had yet been constructed that resulted in 
ingrip, these schemas had no value associated with them. Once a strategy to activate ingrip 
had been learned, however, CLA had its first valuable schema:
 +s3/forward/+s3+ingrip. (6.3)
With the creation of Schema 6.3, the value of ingrip was propagated back through all the 
schemas (section 6.1), including schemas 6.1 and 6.2. The post-training deferred values of 
the primitive items can be seen in Table 6.3. These schemas, developed in every run of the 
experiment, map out the actions needed to center a specimen in the camera, move towards 
it, and acquire it.
Learning Hidden Features
In every run, CLA used the lower-level schemas to create higher-level items that 
were not part of the original set of primitive items. For example:
 [+s1/turnl/+s2]. (6.4)
Synthetic Item 6.4 is a synthetic feature that comes from Schema 6.1. The item indicates 
whether Schema 6.1 will succeed. In other words, when Synthetic Item 6.4 is true, then 
the robot can expect that turning left will move the specimen from Sector 1 to Sector 2. 





Table 6.3 Deferred value of primitive items after training. This table lists the deferred value after 
training of the primitive items in the foraging experiment. Using CLA̓ s system for learning with delayed 
reward, each item eventually received a value determined by their distance from a valuable item (ingrip) 
through the available schemas. These values were assigned to these items consistently (S.D. = 0) for every 
run.
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tions. Synthetic item 6.4 is designed to reflect those conditions. Synthetic items like these 
augment the original state space and add new properties. They became incorporated in 
higher-level schemas that further describe the robotʼs interaction with its environment, as 
seen in the next section.
Feature Refinement
The partitions s1 through s5 are low resolution, and would not be very useful for 
more subtle tasks. However, CLA recognizes that the blob tracker has more than five states 
and builds schemas that represent a specimen being in different places within a sector. For 
example:
 +s1/turnl/+s1. (6.5)
Schemas 6.5 states that sometimes turning left with a specimen in Sector 1 will result in the 
specimen remaining in Sector 1. This and related schemas were generated during every run 
of the experiment. This can happen if the specimen shows up in the far left part of Sector 
1. Schema 6.5 is an alternative to Schema 6.1: sometimes one applies, sometimes the other. 
The presence of both alternatives allows CLA to reason about both conditions, including 
how they relate to each other:
 +[+s1/turnl/+s1]/turnl/+s1+[+s1/turnl/+s2] (6.6)
Schema 6.6 says that, if the robot is in a state where turning left will keep the specimen in 
Sector 1, and then we turn left, then (of course) the specimen will be in Sector 1 and now 
the robot is in a state where turning left is more likely to move the specimen from Sector 1 
to Sector 2. This schema was generated in 8 out of 10 runs.
By constructing synthetic items like these CLA is effectively refining the resolution 
of the blob tracker. Synthetic items not only represent new features, but also represent a 
refinement of existing features.
Object Persistence
CLA also learns that sometimes turning will make a specimen appear in the cam-
era:
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 /turnr/+s5, (6.7) 
 /turnl/+s1. (6.8)
If the robot cannot see any specimens, Schemas 6.7 and 6.8 give it a policy to explore by 
turning. At the lower level, both of these schemas are roughly equal in reliability (Schema 
6.7: M = .082, S.D. = .012; Schema 6.8: M = .091, S.D. = .014) t(18) = -1.42, P > 0.5 (two-
tailed), and sometimes the robot will alternate between the two schemas, turning back and 
forth. When the second layer trains, however, Schemas 6.7 and 6.8 are used to create syn-
thetic items which address the problem of the alternating strategies:
 [/turnr/+s5]/turnr/[/turnr/+s5]. (6.9)
Schema 6.9 says that if the robot is in a state such that turning right might reveal a speci-
men on the right side of the camera, and the robot turns right, then the robot can expect that 
turning right again reveals a specimen. Schema 6.9 (M = .314, S.D. = .052) is more reliable 
than Schemas 6.7, t(18) = -14.032, P < 0.001 (two-tailed), and 6.8, t(18) = -13.365, P < 
0.001. The increased reliability of Schema 6.9 mean that it gets selected over Schemas 6.7 
and 6.8, which encourages turning in the same direction rather than turning back and forth. 
Schema 6.9 was generated for every run.
CLA also uses these synthetic items at the second level to remember specimens that 
have moved out of view:
 +s5/turnl/-s5+[/turnr/+s5]. (6.10)
Schema 6.10 says that, if the robot sees a specimen at the far right, and the robot turns left, 
the specimen will disappear, but turning back to the right will make the specimen reappear. 
This schema was generated for every run. Taken together, Schemas 6.7 through 6.10 is the 
beginning of the concept of object permanence. These schemas the robot the ability to find 
new specimens and reacquire lost ones.
CLA Performance
As stated earlier, the learning system acquired the necessary navigation schemas 
quite quickly. But the final piece of the puzzle was learning how to get the specimen in the 
grippers (Schema 6.3). Even though many schemas were learned in the first 1000 epochs, 
performance did not improve until Schema 6.3 was discovered, which usually occurred 
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between 1500 and 3000 epochs. These basic schemas were enough to bring performance to 
a high level, which is not surprising considering how simple the domain is.
Upper-level schemas performed better than lower-level schemas. There are many 
possible explanations for the increase in performance, and this section describes one of these 
possibilities as an illustration of how higher-level schemas can improve performance.
The higher-level schemas that refine the blob tracker (described above) result in 
increased efficiency and can improve the robotʼs performance. At the lower level, CLA 
generated schemas like 6.1 through 6.3 to build a policy for obtaining the specimen. How-
ever, recall that the schema used most, Schema 6.2, is not very reliable. Sometimes moving 
forward would remove the specimen from Sector 3, if the specimen was to the left or right 
of center of Sector 3. These cases are described by their own schema:
 +s3/forward/+s2. (6.11)
Schema 6.11 states that sometimes when a specimen is centered, and the robot moves for-
ward, the specimen will drift into Sector 2. This schema is less reliable than Schema 6.2 
(M = .113, S.D. = .020), t(18) = 23.46, P < 0.001 (two-tailed), but nevertheless describes 
an alternative future state when approaching a specimen.
Should the specimen drift into Sector 2, the system can easily correct itself:
 +s2/turnl/+s3. (6.12)
Schema 6.12 states that a specimen in Sector 2 can be moved to Sector 3 by turning left. 
Before the upper-level schemas started training, these schemas gave a general strategy to 
acquire a specimen. However, in the case when the specimen is not centered in the cam-
eraʼs view, the strategy of these schemas has the robot arc towards the specimen — move 
forward until the specimen leaves the sector, turn left, repeat — rather than approach the 
specimen in a straight line (see Figure 6.4). When the robot is a long distance from the 
specimen, arcing increases the time to intercept the specimen. When the robot is closer, 
arcing increases the chance that the approach will be too oblique to get the specimen in 
the grippers, and will simply knock it away. There is no way, given the schemas at the first 
level, to solve this problem.
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However, the upper-level schemas can identify the cases where lower-level schemas 
will succeed and fail. In fact, the very problem described above is captured by a second-
level schema:
 +s2/turnl/+s3+[+s3/forward/+s2]. (6.13)
Schema 6.13 says that if the specimen is in Sector 2, then turning left will center the speci-
men, but it also increases the likelihood that moving forward will put the schema back in 
Sector 2. This schema was generated for every run. This is not a schema that CLA can use 
to avoid this problem though because the result (s3) make Schema 6.13 appear valuable. 
However, another second-level schema describes how to fi x the problem:
Using Lower-Level Schemas
Using Upper-Level Schemas
Figure 6.4: Two strategies for acquiring a specimen. Different strategies for acquiring a specimen are il-
lustrated, using lower-level schemas (top) and upper-level schemas (bottom). The lower-level schemas had 
the robot rotate towards the specimen 5° at a time, increasing the time to the specimen and the chance that 
the approach would be oblique. Upper-level schemas built a strategy that accounted the increased time and 
turned the robot towards the specimen 10° at a time. The upper-level schema placed the specimen more in 
the center of the camera, decreasing the time to the specimen and the chance of an oblique approach which 





The context of Schema 6.14 is the same as the result of Schema 6.13. Schema 6.14 says, 
generally, that turning left twice will increase the chances that moving forward will keep 
the specimen centered. Schema 6.14 was generated in 7 of the 10 runs. Schemas 6.13 and 
6.14 are very reliable (Schema 6.13: M = .88, S.D. = .002; Schema 6.14: M = .79, S.D. = 
.004), and will get chosen over 6.12 (M = .26; S.D. = .011). The result is that the robot, 
when centering on a specimen, will turn twice to get the specimen more in the center of 
the camera. The result is a shorter distance to the target, and less likelihood of an oblique 
approach (Figure 6.4). Higher-level schemas like these could account for the higher perfor-
mance seen after 10000 epochs.
Schema Reliability
As noted earlier, higher-level schemas like 6.9 more reliable than lower-level 
schemas such as 6.7 and 6.8. This disparity is generally true of most lower-level and high-
er-level schemas. The final reliability (taken at the end of 20000 training epochs) of all 
first-level and second-level schemas was averaged over ten training runs. The results can 
Figure 6.5: Average reliability of lower-level and upper-level schemas. Reliability of a schema is the 
percentage of times that the schema performed and the result was obtained. The error bars show the stan-
dard error. Lower-level schemas represent a coarse view of the environment, and are less reliable. Upper-
level schemas are significantly more accurate and thus more reliable.
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be seen in Figure 6.5. First-level schemas had an average reliability of 40.5% (S.D. = .010), 
while second-level schemas had an average reliability of 88.6% (S.D. = .074). This dif-
ference is statistically significant, t(18) = -13.389, P < 0.001 (two tailed). A histogram of 
schema reliabilities for a typical single run is shown in Figure 6.6. 
The increased reliability indicates that the schemas at the second level were a better 
model of the environment than the schemas at the first level. Second-level schemas were 
more reliable because they used synthetic items that more accurately reflected the environ-
ment. This particular experiment is a very simple task where the first-level schemas did 
quite well, so the difference was relatively small. But improved reliability increases the 
chance that a schema will get chosen, as shown earlier in this section.
6.2.7 Experiment 1 Conclusion
The foraging experiment showed that CLA can learn using delayed rewards. It 
improves on other Reinforcement Learning systems by building new features from the en-
vironment that can be used in a control policy. CLA developed a set of schemas that were 
used to allow a realistic robot to target and acquire specimens. Higher-level schemas were 
developed that gave the robot a more sophisticated and more reliable set of policies. The 
Figure 6.6: Histogram of schema reliabilities. This histogram shows the number of schemas in each 
reliability percentile for lower-level schemas (light gray) and upper-level schemas (dark gray) for a single 
typical run. Lower-level schemas averaged 41% reliability (S.D.. = 0.16) while upper-level schemas aver-
aged 89% (S.D. = 0.11). Second-level schemas were more reliable because they used synthetic items that 
more accurately reflected the environment.
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constructivist process resulted in new features that more accurately reflected the environ-
ment than the primitive features.
6.3 Experiment 2: Graceful Recovery from Damage
The previous experiment demonstrated that higher-level knowledge is useful. In 
this experiment, the role of the lower-level knowledge is underscored. In section 4.4, the 
importance of a hierarchy of knowledge was shown by demonstrating fallback when CLA 
was confronted with confusing input. Fallback allowed the knowledge base to process 
noisy stimuli by using lower-level knowledge — even when higher-level representations 
failed to process the stimuli. In experiment 2, fallback is shown for a mobile robot. The 
robot is shown to ability to degrade gracefully and operate robustly when its sensory ap-
paratus is dramatically altered.
A trained robot is tested to determine its ability to recognize and process noisy 
data. In this case, the data is made noisy by “damaging” the robot, resulting in a 12° turn 
in the robotʼs camera. This change is meant to simulate the damage a robot might receive 
by running into an obstacle with some force, like a rock outcropping. Similar to the CLA 
model of causal perception in Chapter 4, the CLA foraging controller can process the al-
tered information it receives at the lower level, even if the upper level fails to process the 
information.
6.3.1 Experiment Setup
The robot, using the trained knowledge bases from the previous experiement, had 
its camera rotated 12° to the left, which is equivalent to one visible sector (Figure 6.7). The 
robot was allowed to try and acquire specimens. During this time, no CLA training was 
performed, and reliability information was not altered at first. After performance was mea-
sured using the old reliability information, the system updated the reliability of schemas 
and the performance was measured again. This was done 10 times and the performance and 
reliability was obtained using the same technique as the last experiment.
6.3.2 Results
As expected, damaging the robot impacted the performance of the robot consider-
ably. Without resetting any of the schema reliabilities or retraining any of the action maps, 
performance (which was measured the same way as in section 6.2.5) dropped to near zero 
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(M = 1.6, S.D. = 0.84). As the reliability of the schemas adjusted, performance came back 
up to an average of 17.4 specimens collected (S.D. = 3.37; see Figure 6.8).
However, CLA was now using mostly lower-level schemas because of a big drop 
in reliability at the higher level. Lower-level schemas did lose reliability, dropping on aver-
age from 40.5% to 34.8% reliability (S.D. = .048), t(18) = 3.689, P = 0.002 (two-tailed). 
Higher-level schemas had a more pronounced drop in reliability, from 88.6% to 44.6% 
(S.D. = .032), t(18) = 10.821, P < 0.001 (two-tailed). These results are discussed in the next 
section.
6.3.3 Discussion
After the robot was damaged, the schemas that had been the most reliable become 
useless for guiding the robot towards the specimens. These schemas then adjusted their 
reliability to refl ect the new state of the environment. The updated reliabilities allowed 
CLA to make more informed decisions regarding which schemas to use, and performance 
returned to near pre-damage levels.
But CLA had started using more lower-level schemas and neglecting the higher-
level schemas because higher-level schemas had become much less reliable. The reliability 
of the schemas at both the fi rst and second level were impacted. However, the impact for 
the second-level schemas was greater than that of the fi rst-level schemas. The reliability 
of all lower-level and upper level schemas were averaged and compared to before-damage 
reliabilities (Figure 6.9). Lower-level schema reliability dropped from 40.5% to 34.8%, 
Figure 6.7: The damaged robotʼs visual system. The damaged robotʼs camera has been turned to the 
left 12°. Itʼs current view is in gray. The original view is in the dotted lines for comparison. This change 
represents the damage a robot might sustain, change its view of the world. CLA provides the robot a way 
to recover from this damage.
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which is a difference of nearly 6 points, or 14% of peak performance. Several of the indi-
vidual lower-level schemas dropped to near 10% reliability, mostly those with the forward 
action. But the average stayed high because some schemas became more reliable.
However the higher-level schemas became much less reliable. The reliability of 
upper-level schemas dropped from 88.6% to 44.6%, a drop of 44 points, 50% of peak per-
formance. The reason for this difference is that the higher-level schemas are only as good 
as the lower-level schemas upon which they rely. Higher-level schemas are built using the 
most reliable schemas from the lower level. When these schemas become unreliable, then 
the higher-level schemas fail in greater numbers. For example, schema 6.2 becomes unreli-
able, then schema 6.14 — which offered such a great advantage before the damage — is 
now so unreliable that it is useless. Upper-level schemas have focussed on the most reliable 
lower-level schemas to build higher-level knowledge. When reliability at the lower-level 
shifts, it disappears at the higher-level.
This problem is not peculiar to CLA. The reason the higher-level schemas are fail-
ing is because they are a more accurate representation of the environment before the dam-
Figure 6.8: Performance of the robot at different stages. The robotʼs performance is measured using 
lower-level schemas before higher level schemas are trained, after the higher level schemas are trained, 
and after the robot received damage. The higher-level schemas slightly improved the performance of the 
robot. The damage initially brought performance to near zero. But as CLA adjusted the reliability of the 
schemas, the robot recovered most of its performance. This is an demonstration of fallback and recovery 
in a mobile robot.
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age to the robot. Any highly accurate model will fail greatly when the assumptions of 
the model change. On the other hand, a coarse representation while less accurate is not 
so brittle. CLA solves the problem of trade-off between gross and fine-tuned models by 
building one from the other, and keeping them both. Maintaining the multiple levels of a 
hierarchical knowledge base allows CLA to be highly accurate under optimal conditions, 
and highly reliable under suboptimal conditions. This makes CLA preferable to any robot 
controller that is hand-coded and tailored to a given environment or task.
6.3.4 Experiment 2 Conclusion
Experiment 2 demonstrated that a robot using CLA as a controller will respond 
robustly to changes in the sensory information, including changes caused by damage to 
the robot. By updating the reliability of schemas alone, CLA can recover most of its pre-
damage performance by falling back to lower-level schemas. While higher-level schemas 
increase by more accurately representing the environment, lower-level schemas also give 
CLA an advantage by providing a backup system under adverse conditions. CLA gives a 
robot grounded and robust autonomy.
Figure 6.9: Average applicability of schemas before and after damage. After the damage to the robotʼs 
camera, the lower-level schemas drop from 40.55% reliability to 34.84%. But the higher-level schemas 
drop from 72.1% to 44.82%. Both changes are statistically significant. Higher-level schemas are more 
tuned to the environment and more brittle than the course lower-level schemas. Both the drop in perfor-
mance and the recovery were statistically significant. The presence of the lower-level schemas allows the 
damaged robot to degrade gracefully by relying on lower-level schemas when the upper-level fails.
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6.4 Related Work
While CLA is unique in its approach to learning with delayed reward, there are 
several related technologies. These technologies — including Hierarchical Reinforcement 
Learning, Temporal Transition Hierarchies, Hierarchies of Abstract Machines, the Spatial 
Semantic Hierarchy, and learning from uninterpreted sensors — are compared to CLA 
below.
6.4.1 Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning
There is a type of reinforcement learning that builds a hierarchy of knowledge 
called Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL) (see Barto & Mahadevan 2003 for an 
overview). HRL starts as a standard Reinforcement Learning system by learning a global 
policy table for the environment. HRL then uses this table to explore and develop substruc-
tures of the global policy table. These substructures become higher-level “macro” actions 
that can by used to express a series of elemental actions. In the case of MAXQ (Deitterich 
2000) and HEXQ (Hengst 2002), the state space is searched for common subtasks that 
are repeated or utilized in different parts of the policy table. Another example is Options 
(Stolle & Precup 2002; Kretchmar, Feil & Bansal 2003; Mannor et al 2004), which parti-
tions the state space and identifies transitional subgoals to move from one partition to the 
other. In general, HRL is concerned with grouping actions together into a macro action.
CLA, on the other hand, is not building macro actions, but constructing higher-
level features. The CLA approach to learning with delayed rewards is to refine the state 
space and build new features to describe unseen states. These higher-level features are not 
simply the sum of their parts, but represent hypothetical features that were not prebuilt into 
the learning system. HRL̓ s macro actions are not new in this way; instead, they are simply 
a collection of atomic actions.
6.4.2 Temporal Transition Hierarchies
Temporal Transition Hierarchies (Ring 1994) are very similar to the HRL systems 
described above. This system connects states to actions using a neural network architec-
ture. The weights of the network represent the desirability of an action given a state, or the 
importance of a state following an action. As the system is trained, it locates state/action 
pairs with a high connecting weight and combines them into a “higher-level” unit that can 
be added to the network.
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The central difference between Temporal Transition Hierarchies and CLA is the 
same as with HRL. The higher-level units learned in Temporal Transition Hierarchies are 
not novel or hypothetical states in the same way that CLA̓ s schemas are. Instead, they are 
simply sequence of actions and state tests that are chained together and treated as a single 
unit. CLA brings more to Reinforcement Learning by introducing new features that aug-
ment and refine the state space.
6.4.3 Hierarchy of Abstract Machines
A learning system more akin with CLA is the Hierarchy of Abstract Machines 
(HAMs; Parr & Russell 1998). HAMs are a hierarchy of Reinforcement Learning systems 
that each operate over different state space. Each state space is a higher-level abstraction 
of the state space below it. The current state is represented within all multiple state spaces 
simultaneously, and the HAMs learn policies at these different levels of abstraction. This 
is very similar to the way CLA operates, except that with HAMs the ontological hierarchy 
is prebuilt. CLA builds its own ontology and learns actions using the features it has devel-
oped.
6.4.4 Spatial Semantic Hierarchy
The Spatial Semantic Hierarchy (SSH) (Kuipers 2000) is also a hierarchical ontol-
ogy for robot control. The SSH ontology has four levels — control, causal, topological 
and metrical — that represent a robots environment. Observations at a lower level can be 
used to build knowledge at a higher level, while policies at a higher level will translate into 
motor commands at the lower level. CLA differs from the SSH in the same way that it dif-
fers from HAMs. The SSH is a prebuilt hierarchical ontology, while CLA builds its own 
hierarchical ontology.
6.4.5 Learning from Uninterpreted Sensors
CLA is probably most similar to work done in learning from uninterpreted sensors 
(Pierce & Kuipers 1997). This work involves a robot equipped with sensors, but the robotʼs 
control system does not know what these sensors represent. The sensor readings are corre-
lated with motor commands to build an interpretation for each sensor and their relationship 
to each other. Once a sensor interpretation is built, the sensors can be used to perceive the 
environment and participate in action policies.
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CLA also treats its primitive features as uninterpreted sensors. Schemas are CLA̓ s 
way to building an interpretation for these features through correlated motor commands. 
Pierce and Kuipers (1997) uninterpreted sensors are not entirely uninterpreted, though, as 
they are assumed to represent the spatial features of the environment. CLA makes no such 
assumption.
However, the largest difference is that Pierce and Kuipers (1997) builds a single 
spatial interpretation of sensors and then terminates. CLA on the other hand continues to 
build new levels of features from the derived interpretations. In a way, CLA treats every 
level as a set of uninterpreted sensors, and uses it to construct yet another level of fea-
tures.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated that CLA gives a robot robust autonomous control. CLA 
learned goal-directed behavior on a realistic robot and developed a hierarchy of senso-
rimotor schemas. The upper-level schemas refined the state space and gave the robot more 
sophisticated control. While the lower-level schemas were utilized when the robot was 
damaged, allowing the robot to recover most of its original performance.
CLA also represents a new approach to learning from delayed rewards. CLA is a 
complementary approach to Reinforcement Learning that elaborates the state space with 
higher-level features indicating the reliability of schemas. These higher-level features be-
come incorporated in the learned policies and result in increased performance and higher 
reliability.
Finally, this chapter, along with Chapters 4 and 5, demonstrate the central hypoth-
esis of this dissertation, that a model of infant cognitive development gives a mobile robot 
robust control.
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7. Discussion and Future Work
In this Chapter, I discuss the accomplishments of the work in this dissertation, and 
suggest some ways in which this work can be advanced. First, I address implementation 
of CLA itself. The next section discusses achievements and potential advances in robotics. 
The third section views the work in the context of psychology. The fourth and final section 
suggests possible future work in neuroscience.
7.1 CLA Implementation
CLA, as presented in Chapter 3, is a simple and modular implementation of an 
unsupervised hierarchical learning system. It uses the SOM as a learning module for each 
layer. The layers are organized into levels, which learn a hierarchical representation of the 
environment on which CLA is trained. SOM layers can communicate with one another by 
using the trained nodes as new feature detectors and generating an activation vector. The 
activation vector re-represents the stimulus in terms of the higher-level schemas, and be-
comes input to another still-higher-level layer.
The implementation of CLA presented in this dissertation, in part, demonstrated 
that a simple hierarchical learning system can bring a number of benefits. But there are 
several aspects of CLA that have not been addressed, and improvements can be made in 
these areas. This section discusses some of these possible enhancements to the CLA imple-
mentation.
7.1.1 Recovery with Re-Learning
Part of the promise of the fallback abilities of CLA is not just that it degrades grace-
fully but also recovers robustly. In the event of an information overflow — either because 
of sensor damage, or changes in the environment, or some other unforeseen event — CLA 
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will recognize that its higher-level representations are failing to assimilate the environ-
ment and drop to a lower level. In Chapter 6, partial recovery was achieved by determining 
which schemas were more reliable in the new world state, and which schemas should be 
ignored. The obvious next step is to re-learn the schemas to better fit the changed environ-
ment.
Presumably, this retraining should take less time than the original training. The 
environment is more likely to change incrementally than cataclysmically, and the existing 
schemas could easily shift from one representation to a another similar one. But CLA will 
still be able to correct its representation even in the event of a radical change, even in the 
most extreme cases where it must re-randomize the schemas and start all over.
While the method of retraining by re-learning is straightforward, it may be difficult 
to decide when to re-learn. In all the applications presented in this dissertation, learning 
took place through random exploration. Indeed, in the early attempts to use CLA with a 
mobile robot in Chapter 6, replacing random exploration with 100% goal directed behav-
ior reduced performance, as good techniques went undiscovered while the robot pursued 
mediocre techniques that happened to develop early in training. Additional logic will be 
required to determine whether the short-term drop in performance that comes from re-
learning is worth performance increase in the long term.
7.1.2 Alternatives to the SOM
The SOM was chosen for CLA because of its ability to cluster stimuli and its neural 
plausibility. As was discussed in section 2.2, the SOM is not the only learning system that 
could work as a module for CLA. In theory, any clustering algorithm would suffice. The 
challenge will be to use the learning system to produce an activation vector in order to con-
nect to a higher layer.
One possible alternative to the SOM would be Independent Component Analysis 
(ICA; Hyvärinen, Karhunen & Oja 2001). ICA could be used to build a set of independent 
features that describe the environment. Using ICA with CLA would likely result in a more 
compact representation than the SOM. Although there is much more computation needed 
for ICA than the SOM, smaller prototype vectors and reduced computational overhead 
would allow CLA to scale to more complex applications. CLA already improves over the 
Schema Mechanism for constructivist learning. Using ICA could make CLA still more ef-
ficient.
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7.1.3 Alternative Integration Methods
While the SOM is good at building representations of cooccurring stimuli, it is not 
very good at recognizing other regularities in the environment, such as rotational, transla-
tional and scaling invariance. It is possible that some lower levels could eventually learn 
these regularities, but implementing more sophisticated feature detectors would make the 
learning process faster. In addition, some knowledge may require low-level integration 
methods; it is possible that such knowledge cannot be learned without rotational invari-
ance, for example. A better understanding of this relationship between integration methods 
and learnability would help make CLA a more powerful learning system.
7.1.4 Using Neighboring Schemas
CLA, as used in the experiments in this dissertation, takes advantage of the SOMʼs 
ability to cluster stimuli into prototypes, and represent more frequent stimuli with finer de-
tail. One feature of the SOM that is not used is the neighborhood effect, where neighboring 
nodes represent similar prototypes (section 2.2.2). This is information already present in 
CLA but currently unused.
One potential use of this information is to develop alternative interpretations (in 
the case of propositional schemas) or alternative strategies (in the case of sensorimotor 
schemas). In practical terms, neighboring schemas could provide an alternative strategy for 
sensorimotor schemas. If some goal was desired, and no schema had that goal as its result, 
CLA could search for schemas that resulted in items that are similar to the goal. Similarly, 
values that are assigned to schemas (as described in section 6.1.1) could be distributed to 
neighboring schemas, on the presumption that they represent similar sensorimotor associa-
tions. The neighborhood feature of the SOM could be used for these and other improve-
ments to the existing CLA algorithm.
7.1.5 Comparison to Reinforcement Learning
As discussed in section 6.1.1, CLA is a complementary approach to Reinforcement 
Learning that elaborates the state space, and addresses the problem of an underdefined 
feature set. A future experiment could demonstrate the importance of constructivism in re-
inforcement learning. This experiment would compare a standard Reinforcement Learning 
algorithm to one that used CLA on a task where the feature set is underdefined. The task 
and feature set could be similar to those used for the experiments in Chapter 6, with the 
addition of new obstacles to overcome, such as invisible barriers. Reinforcement Learn-
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ing would have a problem with such a highly aliased environment, and may not be able to 
learn a sufficient policy acquiring specimens. CLA, however, would be able to build new 
features that described the barriers, and use these features to build strategies for avoiding 
them.
7.2 Robotics
Chapter 5 demonstrated that CLA is a more efficient implementation of the Schema 
Mechanism (Drescher 1991), building a hierarchy of sensorimotor schemas for use in an 
autonomous agent. Chapter 6 showed that CLA can move beyond the Microworld and 
control a realistic robot in a continuous environment. It is a new approach to learning with 
delayed rewards that brings constructivism to Reinforcement Learning. CLA is a robust 
robot controller that responds to damage and other changes by falling back to an earlier 
skill level rather than failing outright.
These experiments are just a beginning for applying CLA to robotics and there is 
great potential for future work to test the limits of CLA and expand its capabilities.
7.2.1 Physical Robot Applications
Controlling a simulated Pioneer robot is different from a controlling physical Pio-
neer robot. A physical robot controller has to deal with many issues: sensor noise and motor 
noise, moving on different surfaces, operating under different lighting conditions, and so 
on. As a robust learning system, CLA is uniquely appropriate for physical robot learn-
ing because it has the capacity to learn about these different conditions and integrate this 
knowledge into a goal-directed policy. If CLA can account for the issues related to physi-
cal robotics, it may be possible to avoid programming for these conditions altogether, and 
allow CLA to build schemas that can handle conditions like slippery floors or unreliable 
range sensors. Using CLA to handle these problems would help reduce the burden of the 
robot engineer.
7.2.2 Other Robot Platforms
CLA makes no assumptions about the sensory or motor apparatus that the robot 
has. This means that CLA is flexible enough to work with any robot configuration. The 
knowledge base generated by CLA on different robotic platforms would be useful in two 
ways. For one, the knowledge base would include schemas that reflect the peculiarities 
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of the given robotic platform, and could be used as a starting point for robot engineers. 
If an online learning system is not tenable for a given application, CLA could be used to 
pre-learn the knowledge base, and the robot engineers could use the resulting hierarchy 
of schemas to program the robot for more complex tasks. Like the idea of using CLA to 
handle peculiarities in the environment, CLA can be used to handle peculiarities in the 
robot apparatus.
Along the same lines, the knowledge could also be used as a diagnostic. By learn-
ing a knowledge base on a robot platform and analyzing the resulting knowledge hierarchy, 
engineers can see if CLA is compensating for flaws in the robot with corrective schemas. 
Since CLA̓ s built knowledge reflects the agent, the knowledge can be used to analyze the 
agent.
7.3 Psychology
CLA is a model of infant cognitive development that can replicate infant studies. It 
is the first model of infant cognition that is also a mobile robot controller, and it brings all 
the features of constructivist learning — grounded knowledge, adaptation and robustness 
— to robotics. Using a cognitive model to control a robot expands our understanding of 
infant cognitive development, and gives an important modeling tool to the field of infant 
psychology.
While CLA has reproduced infant studies, it could also be used to make predictions 
of its own. It could also be used to apply the results of robotics applications back to infant 
cognition. Finally, CLA can be applied beyond infant cognition to higher-level cognition. 
These three topics are discussed in more detail below.
7.3.1 Testable Predictions
An important step in the acceptance of CLA as a model of infant cognition is to pro-
vide testable predictions. CLA must model some domain in infant cognition and provide a 
hypothesis that can be tested in the lab. If this is achieved, then CLA will be verified as a 
powerful model of infant cognition. Additionally, any feedback from these predictions can 
inform a future version of CLA, making CLA a better model and a more useful tool for 
robotics and cognition.
An obvious and excellent domain for CLA to generate testable hypotheses is motor 
development. This is discussed next.
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7.3.2 Understanding Motor Development through Robotics
CLA is used to model causal perception in Chapter 4. Although it is controlling a 
robot in Chapter 6, CLA has not modeled any infant motor studies. Motor development 
in infants is an important part of cognitive development, and some have said it is vital 
for learning certain concepts such as distance perception and spatial search (Campos et 
al 2000). It is a logical extension of the work in this dissertation to bring what has been 
learned about motor control with CLA to robotics and relate it to CLA̓ s model of infant 
cognitive development. For example, it may be possible to replicate the results of Campos 
et al (2000) by testing a robotʼs ability to visually search for items with a strictly proposi-
tional set of schemas (as in Chapter 4) versus a set of sensorimotor schemas (as in Chapter 
6). This study could confirm that motor development is used for spatial search, as Campos 
et al (2000) has shown for infants.
A model of infant motor development would be an important contribution to in-
fant cognition. It would also further mature CLA in both robotics and infant cognition. 
This kind of mutual contribution is the power of a multidisciplinary computational model 
because, as each field answers one set of questions, it simultaneously poses a new set of 
questions to the other field.
7.3.3 Adult Cognition and Language
CLA may be applicable to cognitive modeling beyond infancy. The Information 
Processing Principles, upon which CLA is based, is postulated to account for learning 
throughout adulthood. CLA could be used to model adult cognition to demonstrate that 
human learning uses the same techniques at any age. Demonstrating this common learning 
system would be an important contribution to psychology, and would open the door for 
CLA to model a number of adult cognitive tasks.
Chief among these tasks is natural language processing. Language has long been 
the center of a debate on the origins of intelligence. CLA could be used to build a model of 
language that captures its hierarchical nature, from phonemes to words to phrases to sen-
tences. Recent studies have found that there my be more information in the environment 
about language than originally thought. Saffran, Aslin and Newport (1996) have shown 
that infants can find word boundaries in artificial speech by learning the statistical relation-
ship between neighboring speech sounds. Saffran, Senghas and Trueswell (2001) reported 
that older infants then package collections of words into phrases. This part-to-whole pro-
gression is exactly the kind of hierarchical structure that CLA can learn.
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Saffran, Senghas and Trueswell (2001) also suggested that statistical regularities 
are not enough to learn meaning, and Marcus et al (1999) have challenged the statistical 
approach to language learning by showing that infants can learn abstract algebraic rules 
that are central to language syntax. It is not clear that the associative techniques of CLA are 
enough to learn algebraic rules, but rules might be handled by expanding CLA̓ s informa-
tion integration methods, as suggested in section 7.1.3.
Many learning systems have been used to learn some aspect of language or model 
language acquisition (including the SOM), but a hierarchical learning system like CLA 
has never been used to learn natural language. A study of language acquisition using CLA 
would be a major contribution to adult cognition, language and computer science.
7.5 Neuroscience
Although CLA is based on the SOM, which has been shown to model neural maps 
in the human brain, this dissertation does not depend on whether CLA itself is neurally 
plausible. However, by using the SOM as its central learning module makes CLA closer to 
an accurate model of neuroscience than learning systems that are unrelated to neurology. 
CLA was designed with neural plausibility in mind by utilizing few techniques that are 
neurally implausible. The hope was to design a learning system that could one day model 
neural structures in the brain, while remaining a cognitive model and a robot controller. A 
learning system that models not only cognition but neuroscience as well would be a power-
ful tool, and would help explain the connection between the two. Its connection to robotics 
makes it more powerful still, as robotics validates the model in the real world, showing that 
the model actually works. The work of turning CLA into a neural model lies in the hands 
of future scientists, and this section discusses some of the approaches that can be used to 
connect CLA to neuroscience.
7.5.1 Neurological Confirmation
While the SOM models neural maps, and maps are known to be connected to one 
another, there is no computational model for multiple levels of maps in the human brain. 
CLA uses Hebbian learning to interconnect the SOM layers, so both the layers and their 
connectors have a basis in neuroscience. CLA̓ s inter-layer communication should be com-
pared and contrasted to connections between neural maps in the brain. This comparison 
would be a major contribution to computer science and neuroscience, plus the differences 
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between the two can be used to make CLA more realistic, increase its efficiency and broad-
en its applicability.
7.5.2 Testable Predictions
If CLA can be demonstrated to realistically model neurology, CLA should be used 
to produce testable predictions about how neurons activate and develop. For example, CLA 
could build a hierarchical representation of visual stimuli. This representation could be 
used to predict how neural maps in the brain would organize the same sensory information, 
and these predictions could be compared to the neural learning patterns in the brain for the 
same visual stimuli. Much like the testable predictions in infant cognition (section 7.4.1), a 
prediction from CLA that can be tested would isolate differences and similarities between 
the brain and CLA. Just as it is powerful to have a model that is used in both cognition and 
robotics, it would be more powerful still if the same model was applicable to neuroscience, 
allowing all three disciplines to inform each other.
7.5.3 Prefrontal Cortex for Decision Making
In an example of knowledge that can be brought from neuroscience to cognition 
and robotics, CLA̓ s goal-directed behavior can be informed by a neural approach. Cur-
rently, CLA uses a system of value and reliability to choose between schemas for planning 
and action. CLA could expand its neural plausibility by using a neurological technique to 
perform this reasoning task. The prefrontal cortex of the human brain has been implicated 
in making value judgements and choosing among options (Damasio 1994). A neurological 
model of decision making in the prefrontal cortex, particularly the limbic system, could 
be combined with the schema development process of CLA to make a more fully neural 
model of cognitive development. A neural model of decision making would help bridge 
the gap between neuroscience and cognition, and would allow benefits from one field to be 
brought to the other, just as CLA currently benefits both infant cognition and robotics.
7.6 Conclusion
CLA is the first model of infant cognition used as a robot controller, and it has made 
contributions to both domains. These contributions are starting points for future work in 
robotics, cognition, and learning systems. CLA also has potential as a neural model. A 
model that addresses two or more disciplines is an important tool that allows knowledge 
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to be shared and utilized across domains. CLA is such a model, and advances with CLA in 
one discipline will benefit them all.
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8. Conclusions
This dissertation demonstrated that a computational model of infant cognitive de-
velopment gives a robot robust autonomy. Constructivist learning in infants, as described 
by the Information Processing Principles (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002), is modeled by 
the Constructivist Learning Architecture, or CLA. CLA is implemented by an intercon-
nected hierarchy of SOMs. CLA can replicate studies of infant cognition, and can produce 
both propositional schemas and sensorimotor schemas. CLA gives a mobile robot robust 
autonomy. These contributions are reviewed by chapter below.
Chapter 2 introduced the foundations of CLA. The SOM (Kohonen 1997) was re-
viewed, which functions as a central learning component of CLA. The Information Pro-
cessing Principles (Cohen, Chaput & Cashon 2002), a collection of principles that describe 
infant cognitive development for many domains and throughout infancy, were introduced. 
The Information Processing Principles form the design specification of CLA. Chapter 2 
also introduced the idea of fallback, which allows a learning system to respond to confus-
ing input by falling back to a lower level of knowledge, rather than failing completely. 
Fallback is the attribute of the Information Processing Principles that CLA uses to give 
robots robust autonomy.
Chapter 3 introduced CLA, a new self-organizing hierarchical learning system for 
modeling infant cognition and controlling a mobile robot. CLA is built using the SOM, 
and learns knowledge in multiple layers. A layer of knowledge is develops as a new set 
of feature detectors. These feature detectors can take a stimulus and produce an activation 
vector, which becomes the input to the next layer. CLA layers can be connected in a variety 
of architectures. CLA can also detect when input is confusing and invoke fallback by ignor-
ing higher layers and utilizing lower layers.
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Chapter 4 demonstrated that CLA is a model if infant cognitive development. CLA 
replicates a set of studies on infant causal perception. It not only learns causal perception, 
but learns it in the same way that an infant does: starting with the components of the event, 
and integrating them into a causal view. CLA exhibited stage-like development, just as 
infants to. CLA also demonstrated fallback when presented with a noisy launching event. 
CLA could process the noisy event using the lower-level schemas, even though the upper-
level schemas failed to process the event. CLA is the first computation model of construc-
tivist learning in infants, and the first full implementation of the Information Processing 
Principles.
Chapter 5 demonstrated that CLA could learn not only propositional schemas, but 
also sensorimotor schemas, which are crucial for controlling a robot. CLA also reproduced 
the functionality of the Schema Mechanism (Drescher 1991), and did so more efficiently.
Chapter 6 demonstrated that CLA gives a realistic robot robust autonomy. CLA was 
used to control a simulated Pioneer robot and learned to forage for specimens. CLA learned 
using delayed rewards, demonstrating that CLA is a constructivist approach to standard 
Reinforcement Learning techniques. CLA̓ s hierarchical knowledge base refined the origi-
nal state space, found hidden features, and supported fallback when the robotʼs vision sys-
tem was damaged. CLA recovered from the damage by using lower-level representations, 
and the robot regained most of its pre-damage performance.
Together, these chapters show an approach to learning that is applicable to infant 
cognitive development and robust robot control. CLA̓ s hierarchical learning capabilities 
offer improved performance or enhanced capabilities to several other machine learning 
systems and cognitive models. CLA bridges the gap between computer science and psy-
chology, and provides a learning system that contributes to both and supports the transfer 
of science and technology from one discipline to the other.
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